STRUCTURING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ELECTORAL MECHANICS:
EXPLANATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES
CHRISTOPHER S. ELMENDORF t

This Article is the first of a series on constitutionaljudicial review of what
the Supreme Court has termed "the mechanics of the electoral process," defined
to include "the registrationand qualification of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, and the voting process." Over the last few years, this subject has assumed a new salience as litigators challenge novel state-mandated
proceduresfor registration, voting, and vote counting. For the first time since
the 1960s, a significant number of voter participation cases are moving
through the lower courts. The courts are substantially in agreement that these
claims are governed by the doctrinalframework set forth in Burdick v. Takushi, but there is a catch: Burdick's statement of black-letter law significantly
misdescribes the Supreme Court's actual practice in its electoral mechanics jurisprudence-orso I argue here. As a result, lower courts confronted with the
new generation of voter participationclaims have often pursued analytic methods that the Supreme Court is not likely to find congenial. Important avenues
for doctrinalexperimentation and elaboration are being overlooked. This Article develops a schematic map and a vocabulary for talking about the Supreme
Court's methods in its electoral mechanics jurisprudence, one that should help
lower courts (as well as litigants and law professors) to think more productively
about the critical threshold question in such cases: what is the standardof review, and why? By way of illustration, the Article examines and critiques successive district court opinions enjoining Georgia's new photo ID requirements
for voting.
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INTRODUCTION

Election law is coming full circle. In the 1960s, when the Warren
Court declared that the "right to vote" was a "fundamental political
right" protected by the Constitution, the major cases concerned access
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to the polls and the weighting of votes.! Different issues took center
stage23in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The Court delved into ballot access. It circumscribed the regulation of campaign finance. 3 It created associational rights for political parties.4 And, through the Voting Rights Act, it limited the use of representational structures that,
without weighting votes unequally, nonetheless disadvantaged racial
minorities. 5
Today, however, voting itself is moving back to center stage-but
in a new guise. Instead of challenging the dejure exclusion from the
franchise of certain classes of voters, or the malapportionment of legislative districts, litigators are pressing claims that state-mandated procedures for registration, voting, and vote-counting-the nuts and bolts
of elections-operate to burden voter participation excessively or unfairly." In the past two years alone, litigants have mounted successful
constitutional challenges to novel voter ID requirements enacted by
Georgia in 2005, 7 by Missouri in 2006,8 and by Ohio in 2006. 9 Liti-

I See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union
Free
Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89
(1965); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2 See, e.g., Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279
(1992); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party,
479 U.S. 189 (1986); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Clements v. Fashing,
457 U.S. 957 (1982); 111.State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173
(1979); Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724
(1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
3 E.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978);
Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
4 E.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); Eu
v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn.,
479 U.S. 208 (1986); Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450

U.S. 107 (1981).

Compare City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-68 (1980) (holding that
racial
vote dilution claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment require proof of discriminatory intent), with Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43-46 (1986) (holding that
the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act authorize effects-based racial vote dilution claims).
6 This Article focuses on claims founded on the Constitution.
For a discussion of
such claims under the Voting Rights Act, see Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial:
Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REv. 689 (2006). Tokaji, following the lexicon introduced in Pamela S. Karlan's The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism
About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1705, 1707-08 (1993), refers to these as "voter participation" claims, as distinguished from "representation" and "governance" claims. I
shall use the same terminology in this Article.
7 Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Common Cause/Ga.
1), 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326,
1356-70 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (issuing a preliminary injunction after determining that the
5
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gants have also won injunctions against new laws in Georgia, Florida,
and Ohio that regulate voter registration drives by civil-society organizations.' ° And lawyer-activists convinced the Sixth Circuit that Ohio
may not employ demonstrably inferior vote-counting technology in
On the
some counties if it uses superior technology elsewhere."
other hand, voter ID challenges have been rebuffed by several
courts,12 and the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in a vote-counting case drew a
3

withering dissent.
Given that four decades have passed since the Supreme Court
converted voting into a fundamental right, one might expect there to
be fairly well-settled answers to the question of what triggers heightened scrutiny in the voting rights domain, and what applying heightened scrutiny entails. The recent spate of litigation suggests that
there is, in fact, substantial judicial agreement that constitutional challenges to the nuts and bolts of registration and voting are to be resolved using the method set forth in Burdick v. Takushi, 4 a 1992 deci-

ID requirement effected a "severe burden" on the right to vote, and was tantamount to
a poll tax).
Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 217-19 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). This case
was nominally decided on state constitutional grounds, but the opinion largely follows
the doctrinal framework employed in the Supreme Court's electoral mechanics jurisprudence, under which "severe restrictions" on voting rights trigger strict scrutiny. See
id. at 212-16 (discussing these restrictions, explaining the application of strict scrutiny,
and comparing cases decided under the federal Constitution).
9 Boustani v. Blackwell, 460 F. Supp. 2d 822, 825-27 (N.D. Ohio
2006) (striking
down an ID requirement for naturalized citizens whose citizenship is challenged at the
polls).
10Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Cox, No. 06-1891, slip op. at 16-17 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 28, 2006) (order granting preliminary injunction) (invalidating a regulation
that required persons registering to vote to seal their completed application prior to
submitting it to any person other than the state registrar or deputy registrar, and that
prohibited the copying of completed voter registration applications); Project Vote v.
Blackwell, 455 F. Supp. 2d 694 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (entering a preliminary injunction
against a law that established registration and training requirements, backed by criminal penalties, for paid participants in voter registration drives); League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Cobb, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (issuing a preliminary injunction against a law that fined voter registration organizations for late submissions).
11 Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated en banc as moot,
473
F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007).
12 See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472
F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007);
Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups
(Common Cause/Ga. III), 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Bay County Democratic Party v. Land, 347 F. Supp. 2d 404 (E.D. Mich. 2004); Colo. Common Cause v.
Davidson, No. 04CV7709, 2004 WL 2360485 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Oct. 18, 2004).
13 Stewart, 444 F.3d at 880-98 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
14 504 U.S. 428 (1992).

2007]

JUDICIAL REVIEW OFELECTORAL MECHANICS

317

sion in which the Supreme Court undertook to restate the doctrines
governing constitutional challenges to electoral mechanics (defined
to include "the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection
and eligibility of candidates, [and] the voting process"' ) .6 Equally,
however, this litigation illustrates the need for a new doctrinal heuristic for describing how the courts are supposed to approach such cases.

Id. at 433 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
Note that
neither Burdick nor Anderson uses the term "electoral mechanics" to describe "the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, and the voting process." My choice of terminology is suggested by McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995), which distinguished Anderson on the ground that the ban
on anonymous political leafleting at issue in McIntyre did not "control the mechanics of
the electoral process," but rather was a content-based "regulation of pure speech."
16 With the exception of Stewart, in each of the federal cases cited in notes
7-13,
supra, the court applied the doctrinal framework of Burdick or Anderson (the principal
case on which the Burdick Court relied). For other recent decisions from the U.S.
courts of appeals applying Burdick to voter participation claims, see Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 (11th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to
the state's use of touchscreen voting without paper verification); Griffin v. Roupas, 385
F.3d 1128, 1130 (7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting an asserted constitutional right of working
mothers to vote by absentee ballot); Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.
2003) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to touchscreen balloting); Werme v.
Merrill, 84 F.3d 479, 483-84 (1st Cir. 1996) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to requirement that certain poll workers be appointed by the two largest political parties);
Ayers-Schaffner v. DiStefano, 37 F.3d 726, 729-30 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding it unconstitutional to exclude from a remedial election qualified voters who failed to participate
in the original, invalid election). See also Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1350-55
(4th Cir. 1993) (applying Anderson and holding unconstitutional a voter registration
law that made registrants' Social Security numbers publicly available).
However, a few judges have read Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), as exempting
from the Burdick framework claims that a state has violated the Equal Protection Clause
by using different voting or vote-counting procedures in different geographic areas.
See Stewart, 444 F.3d at 861-62; Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d
882, 895-96 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated on reh' en banc, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003); cf
Richard L. Hasen, After the Storm: The Uses, Normative Implications, and Unintended Consequences of Voting Reform Research in the Post-Bush v. Gore Equal Protection Challenges, in
RETHINKING THE VOTE 185, 188 (Ann N. Crigler et al. eds., 2004) (arguing that Bush
departs from the Burdickjurisprudence). But see Wexler, 452 F.3d at 1232-33 (applying
Burdick to a constitutional challenge to the use of different recount techniques in different regions); Stewart, 444 F.3d at 886-91 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (rejecting the extension of Bush beyond the narrow context of court-ordered recounts); Weber, 347 F.3d
at 1106 (rejecting the notion that the state's use of different voting technologies in different areas necessitates heightened scrutiny).
Other than the Bsh-based cases, there is only one circuit court decision, postBurdick, that fails to apply Burdick or Anderson in analyzing allegedly unconstitutional
barriers to voter participation. This case, Charfauros v. Board of Elections, 249 F.3d 941
(9th Cir. 2001), is predicated on the assumption that "any restrictions" on the right to
vote trigger strict scrutiny. Id. at 951. That assumption is not tenable after Burdick.
15
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Burdick is widely understood to prescribe sliding-scale or multipletier scrutiny, with the degree of scrutiny a function of the "character17
and magnitude" of the burden on voting or associational rights.
Laws that effect a "severe" burden receive strict scrutiny; laws whose
burden is minimal receive lax, rational-basis-like review; and laws
whose burden is significant but not severe arguably receive something
in between. 1 Working from this starting point, the lower courts recently confronted with voter participation claims have generally begun by asking whether there exists a Supreme Court precedent that
applies strict scrutiny or lenient review to a facially similar law. If so,
and if the court is satisfied that the law at issue is sufficiently similar,
the court will take shelter under the Supreme Court's decision. Illustrative examples include ACORN v. Bysiewicz'9 and the poll tax holding
in the first round of the Common Cause/Georgiav. Billups litigation.20
In Bysiewicz, a federal district judge applied lax review to Connecticut's seven-day advance registration requirement for voting in
general elections. Thirty years earlier, in Marston v. Lewis, an opaque
per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court had said that Arizona's fiftyday registration cutoff was unobjectionable. 2' The Bysiewicz plaintiffs
sought to distinguish Marston on the ground that the plaintiffs in
that case had not introduced evidence concerning the aggregate
impact of the registration requirement.2 By contrast, the Bysiewicz
17 See, e.g., McClure v. Galvin, 386 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[T]he
Supreme
Court has suggested something of a sliding scale approach and has noted that there is
no 'bright line' to separate unconstitutional state election laws from constitutional
ones." (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 350 (1997)); Sw.
Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 899 ("Burdick... described [a] continuum of review .. "); Fishbeck v. Hechler, 85 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[I]n Burdick v. Takushi, the Supreme Court prescribed a sliding scale analysis .... " (citation
omitted)); Republican Party of Ark. v. Faulkner County, 49 F.3d 1289, 1296-97 (8th
Cir. 1995) (characterizing Burdick as an example of "sliding-scale" scrutiny applied by
the Supreme Court in electoral mechanics cases).
18 Although it is unambiguous that Burdick prescribes strict scrutiny for
"severe"
burdens, the standard of review properly applied in nonsevere-burden cases is not entirely clear. See infta notes 65-66 and accompanying text; Part II.C.2.
19 413 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D. Conn.
2005).
20 Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Common Cause/Ga.
I), 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326
(N.D. Ga. 2005); see also Friedman v. Snipes, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1377-78 (S.D. Fla.
2004) (deeming a requirement that absentee ballots be returned by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day a "slight" burden, on the authority of Supreme Court decisions upholding
time deadlines for political participation).
21 410 U.S. 679, 680-81 (1973).
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Request for a Declaration of Unconstitutionality at 56-58, Bysiewicz, 413 F. Supp. 2d 119 (No. 04-1624), 2005 WL
4113331.
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plaintiffs produced uncontroverted studies of voting behavior by
leading political scientists, demonstrating that a large fraction of the
electorate does not "tune in" to political campaigns until just days
before an election, and that rates of electoral participation would
probably rise by about 5% if Connecticut eliminated its pre-election

registration requirement (as have seven other states). 23 But the district court concluded that this evidence was beside the point in light
of the Supreme Court's lack of concern about other modest advance
registration periods.24
In Common Cause/Georgia I, a federal district judge applied strict
scrutiny to Georgia's photo ID requirement for voting. The court reasoned, inter alia, that because Georgia charged a twenty dollar fee for
the one form of state-issued ID made available to all voters, the ID requirement was tantamount to a poll tax. 25 Per
S 26 the Supreme Court's
decision in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, poll taxes-and thus
the Georgia photo ID requirement-were subject to strict scrutiny.2
In much of the new voter participation litigation, however, the
courts have not been able to locate Supreme Court precedents addressing formally similar laws. For example, most courts have thought
it strained to analogize ID requirements to poll taxes if the state
28

charges no fee for its voter ID.
When there is no Supreme Court
precedent addressing the type of law at issue, the lower courts have
generally tried to investigate the actual impact of the challenged law
on political participation.
If the plaintiff establishes to a court's sat-

Id. at 8-13.
Bysiewicz, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 14548.
25 Common Cause/Ga. 1,406 F. Supp. 2d at
1366-70.
23
24

26

383 U.S. 663 (1966).

27 Common Cause/Ga. 1,406 F. Supp. 2d
at 1368.

Federal courts have rejected this analogy as to every ID requirement other than
the one enacted by Georgia in 2005. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd.,
28

472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007) ("The Indiana law is not like a poll tax, where on one
side is the right to vote and on the other side the state's interest in defraying ... election[] [costs] or... limiting the franchise to [certain] people... [or] excluding poor
people or in discouraging [minorities]."); Gonzalez v. Arizona, No. CV 06-1268-PHX,
2006 WL 3627297 at *4-6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2006) (declining to characterize Arizona's
requirements for registration and voting as a poll tax); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups

(Common Cause/Ga. I1), 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1352-55 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (rejecting the
poll-tax characterization of a revised Georgia ID requirement enacted in 2006); Ind.
Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 826-28 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (rejecting the
poll-tax characterization of an Indiana ID requirement).
29 In Common Cause/Georgia I, such anticipated impacts
provided an alternative
ground for applying strict scrutiny and striking down the law. See 406 F. Supp. 2d at

1362-66. For other cases in which courts based the standard of review on the actual or
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isfaction that the challenged law will substantially impact electoral participation, especially by disadvantaged voters, the court will characterize the burden as severe and apply strict scrutiny. 30 If the plaintiff fails
to make this showing, the court will treat the burden as insignificant
or unproven and apply lax scrutiny.3' Federal judges have had differ-

anticipated impact (on voting or political association) of the challenged electoral regulation, or the lack of evidence of such impacts, see infra notes 30-31. Cf Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 663-69 (2007) (commending empirical
approaches to the legal analysis of voter ID requirements).
30 See, e.g., Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform
Now v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-1891-JTC,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87080, at *16-18 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2006) (applying heightened
scrutiny to voter registration regulations that "impair[ed] the ability of some of the
Plaintiffs to obtain funding for voter registration drives" and caused one plaintiff organization not to conduct any drives during the year of the suit); Project Vote v.
Blackwell, 455 F. Supp. 2d 694, 701-07 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (applying heightened scrutiny to various regulations of voter registration by independent organizations, after
concluding that the challenged regulations substantially hindered the plaintiffs' efforts
to register and turn out new voters); League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Cobb, 447 F.
Supp. 2d 1314, 1332-34 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (applying heightened scrutiny to regulations
of voter registration drives, because (i) "[t]here is no dispute that Plaintiffs, all of
whom are dedicated to increasing voter registration and voting, have shut down their
voter registration drives because of the Law's... penalties," and (ii) "Plaintiffs' testimony has demonstrated that the success of voter registration drives is severely undermined when third party organizations cannot collect voter registration applications");
Common Cause/Ga. II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1345-52 (applying exacting scrutiny to Georgia's photo ID requirement, principally because "[t]he evidence in the record demonstrates that many voters who lack an acceptable Photo ID for in-person voting are elderly, infirm, or poor, and lack reliable transportation to a county registrar's office");
Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (foreseeing "an extraordinary and potentially disastrous risk of intimidation and delay," amounting to a
"severe" burden on the right to vote, from the novel application of an Ohio statute authorizing political parties to designate polling place challengers), rev'd sub nom. Summit County Democratic Cent. and Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, 388 F.3d 547, 551
(6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the possibility of "longer lines... result[ing] from
delays and confusion" was unlikely to constitute a severe burden); cf Weinschenk v.
State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 214-15 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (deeming strict scrutiny of Missouri's photo ID requirement appropriate because, inter alia, the procedures for obtaining an ID were "cumbersome" and thus likely to exclude voters who were not adept
at navigating bureaucracies (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harman v.
Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 541 (1965))).
31 See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County
Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir.
2007) ("The fewer the people who will actually disfranchise themselves rather than go
to the bother and.., expense of obtaining a photo ID, the less of a showing the state
need make to justify the law."); Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 (11th Cir.
2006) (applying lax scrutiny to the plaintiff's claim that the unavailability of manual
recounts in those counties using touchscreen voting violates the Equal Protection
Clause, reasoning that the plaintiffs "did not plead that voters in touchscreen counties
are less likely to cast effective votes due to the alleged lack of a meaningful manual recount procedure"); Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying
lenient scrutiny to the state's certification of electronic voting machines, after deriding
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ent understandings about the proper roles for common sense, anecdote, and social-scientific evidence in this inquiry. Some have insisted
32
But
on hard evidence; others have freely indulged in conjecture.
these disagreements, themselves only latent, do not draw into question the basic notion that the task for courts in applying Burdick to
of the challenged
novel fact patterns is to fully investigate the impact
33
law, and then to set scrutiny levels accordingly.
That notion reflects a perfectly sensible, face-value reading of Burdick's statement of legal doctrine. How else but through such an investigation could one say whether the magnitude of a regulatory burden is "severe" or "minor"? Moreover, the Court's rhetoric in
electoral mechanics cases seems to invite all-things-considered, empirically oriented burden inquiries. The Court has reiterated, for example, that "it is essential to examine in a realistic light the nature

as speculative the plaintiff's argument that this technology must be deemed severely
burdensome due to the possibility of massive fraud); Werme v. Merrill, 84 F.3d 479,
484-85 (1st Cir. 1996) (deeming "slight" the burden imposed by a law providing for
major-party appointment of poll workers because, inter alia, "the record evidence offers no reason to believe that minority parties are at special or undue risk because they
have no right to appoint election inspectors and ballot clerks"); Gonzalez v. Arizona,
No. CV 06-1268-PHX, 2006 WL 3627297 at *7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2006) ("Assessing the
severity of the restrictions in this case requires an intense factual inquiry. Plaintiffs presented some evidence that hundreds, possibly thousands, of individuals will not be able
to secure the requisite identification to enable them to vote. But ... it is not clear
what percentage of these individuals wish to vote but are actually unable to obtain identification.... While not wishing to downplay the burden on certain individuals, Plaintiffs have not established that Proposition 200 represents a 'severe' burden."); Ind.
Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 822 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (applying lenient
review to the plaintiffs' voter ID challenge because the "[p]laintiffs ha[d] failed to
submit (1) evidence of individuals who will be unable to vote or who will be forced to
undertake appreciable burdens in order to vote; and (2) any statistics or aggregate
data indicating particular groups who will be unable to vote or will be forced to undertake appreciable burdens in order to vote"); Friedman v. Snipes, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1356,
1378 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (judging a requirement that absentee ballots be returned by 7:00
p.m. on Election Day a "slight restriction[]"); League of Women Voters v. Blackwell,
340 F. Supp. 2d 823, 828-31 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (upholding an ID requirement for firsttime voters after concluding that few voters would be affected and the burden would
not be hard for them to surmount).
32 In the "hard evidence" camp are, for example, IndianaDemocratic
Party v. Rokita
and Gonzalez v. Arizona. Conjectural reasoning about burdens may be found in, for
example, Crawford v. Marion County Election Boardand Common Cause/GeorgiaI
33 I do not claim that the lower courts are in agreement regarding what impacts
properly trigger heightened scrutiny. Some courts seem to focus on the participation
bottom line (i.e., the extent to which the challenged requirement reduces turnout
among eligible voters); others are concerned instead with the number and distribution
of voters who face hurdles that the judge deems "appreciable" as such. I take up these
and other distinctions in the lower courts' thinking in a forthcoming paper.
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and extent... of [the] impact [of ballot-access restrictions] on voters." M And the Court has variously professed that there is "no litmus3
paper test",
for separating valid from invalid electoral mechanics
regulations, no "bright line," 36 no "substitute for the hard judgments
that must be made. " 3 Yet, strangely, when it comes time to decide an
electoral mechanics case, the Court often reverts to formalism and
lays down something like a litmus-paper test.
The Court's practice may be summarized thus: scrutiny levels depend on presumptive, first-pass determinations regarding the constitutional status (permissible or impermissible) of the challenged law.
These determinations generally turn on formal inquiries into the type
of burden38created, simple proxies for impact, and, arguably, legislative
purposes. The Court uses these inquiries not merely as an indirect
means of ascertaining the practical burden on the plaintiff's exercise
of voting or associational rights, or on the exercise of such rights by a
larger class to which the plaintiff belongs. Rather, it appears that in
determining the presumptive constitutional status of challenged electoral mechanics, the Court variously seeks (1) to insure that the electoral system achieves or manifests certain properties in the aggregate
(such as adequate openness to change, political accountability, and
participation by a full cross-section of the citizenry); (2) to identify
laws whose probable costs far outweigh their likely benefits; and,
probably, (3) to cabin lower courts' discretion to intervene in ways
that might draw the judiciary's impartiality into doubt. (Thus, alBullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972), quoted with approval in Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983) and Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963
(1982) (plurality opinion).
35 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974), quoted with approval
in Buckley v. Am.
Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 192 (1999) and Munro v. Socialist Workers
Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986).
36 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520
U.S. 351, 359 (1997).
.47 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,
730 (1974).
38 Others have noted formalistic tendencies
in the Court's election law jurisprudence. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Commentary, Formalism and Functionalism in the Constitutional Law of Politics, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1525 (2003). But whereas Pildes sees the
Court's election law formalism as a consequence of "analogizing from other areas of
law to work out the meaning of the rights of politics," and hence as "fail[ing] to treat
democratic politics as a distinct domain ... in which the meaning of rights ought to be
worked out with references to the function and purposes of the arena of democracy
itself," id. at 1529, I am more sanguine. The Court's electoral mechanics jurisprudence may not be as ambitiously protective of "fair political competition" as Pildes
would like, but it does, I shall argue, evince an appreciation of structural purposes and
prudential concerns that are distinct to election law. It is doctrinally formalistic, but
(often) functionally purposive.
34

2007]

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ELECTORAL MECHANICS

323

though Burdick has come under attack from proponents of "structural" approaches to judicial review of election law, there is actually
much for structuralists to like in the Court's electoral mechanics ju-

risprudence.3 9)
It is not my position that the Supreme Court's electoral mechanics
case law is altogether coherent, in the sense that it reflects a settled
and readily discerned understanding of constitutional purposes, or in
the sense that one can consistently explain, from case to case, the
Court's decision to select one technique or another from its arsenal in

order to flip (or not to flip) the presumption of constitutionality.

39 Whether the courts ought to intervene to guard aggregate/structural
properties

of the electoral system, or just to protect individual rights, has been the subject of a
decade-long debate among election law scholars. See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles,
Judgingthe Law of Politics,103 MICH. L. REV. 1099 (2005) (reviewing RICHARD L. HASEN,
THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAw (2003)) [hereinafter Charles, Judgingthe Law
of Politics] (presenting a perceptive overview and synthesis of the rights/structure debate). The leading protagonists in this debate seem to agree on a descriptive level,
however, that the Court has not been much concerned with structure. See generally
RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW (2003) [hereinafter HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAw] (defending the Court's supposed emphasis on individual rights at the expense of structure); Richard L. Hasen, The Newer
Incoherence: Competition, Social Science, and Balancing in CampaignFinanceLaw After Randall v. Sorrell, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 869-77 (2007) [hereinafter Hasen, The Newer Incoherence] (disputing the hypothesis that Randall signals a turn toward structuralism in
the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
Politics as Markets: PartisanLockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643 (1998)
(advocating that the Court "invert the [prevailing] focus of constitutional doctrine
from the foreground of rights and equality to the background rules that structure partisan political competition"); Pildes, supra note 38. But Charles suggests that in two
areas--malapportionment and racial gerrymandering-"the Court uses rightsspeak... instrumentally [both] to mask and [to] rectify structural concerns." Charles,
Judging the Law of Politics,supra at 1128; see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 601, 657-70 (2007) [hereinafter Charles, Democracy and Distortion] (elaborating on this idea).
My take on the electoral mechanics case law is broadly consistent with Charles's
account of the malapportionment and Voting Rights Act case law. The Court uses the
language of rights but its decisions are often easier to understand from a structural
perspective (i.e., one concerned with the overall functioning of the political process).
See also Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection
from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1345, 1346 (2001) (arguing that in
the Shaw line of cases and in Bush v. Gore, the Court "deploy[ed] the Equal Protection
Clause not to protect the rights of an identifiable group of individuals, particularly a
group unable to protect itself through operation of the normal political processes, but
rather to regulate the institutional arrangements within which politics is conducted"
(footnote omitted)).
40 Cf Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc.,
525 U.S. 182, 208 (1999)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (comparing precedents involving "voting and associational
interests" with precedents about "core political speech," and observing that in the for-
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My more limited claim is that the Court has answered the Burdick
threshold question using a number of analytic strategies that, though
sharing certain commonalities, bear at most a passing resemblance to
41
the burden investigation process connoted by the Burdick test.
Better heuristics for the process by which the Court sets scrutiny
levels in its Burdickjurisprudence can be found, ironically, in two election law domains that have not been assimilated into the Burdick
framework. 42 Justice Breyer, writing for the plurality in Randall v.
Sorrell,43 offered the best heuristic yet: he proposed that courts should
look for "danger signs" of a substantial threat to the democratic process before applying heightened scrutiny to campaign contribution limits. Breyer then located such a scrutiny-elevating danger sign in the
fact that the challenged contribution limits were lower than those in
46
any other state.4 5 Justice Souter, dissenting in Vieth v. Jubelirer,
said
that the Court's job in partisan gerrymandering cases was to "identify
clues, as objective as we can make them, indicating that partisan competition has reached an extremity of unfairness." 47 This is in fact what
the Supreme Court's Burdickjurisprudence is largely about: ajudicial
mer domain, "our cases are much harder to predict, and I am not at all sure that a coherent distinction between severe and lesser burdens can be culled from them").
41 A couple of commentators have suggested that the severe/lesser burden inquiry
is utterly without structure and "inherently subjective." Lowell J. Schiller, Recent Development, Imposing Necessary Boundaries on Judicial Discretion in Ballot Access Cases:
Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029 (2005), 29 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 331, 338 (2005);
see also Joshua A. Douglas, Note, A Vote for Clarity: Updating the Supreme Court's Severe
Burden Test for State Election Regulations that Adversely Impact an Individual'sRight To Vote,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 372, 381-82 (2007). I consider this view unjustifiably grim. To
be sure, there is no single "coherent distinction" that unifies all the precedents. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 208. But as I endeavor to show in the next Part, the cases do exhibit
characteristic modes of analysis, and there is enough structure in them to infer lessons
for lower courts.
42 The domains in question concern campaign
finance and the design of legislative districts. The reader may ask, "Are these not species of electoral mechanics?" It is
a fair question. I do not attempt in this Article to define the conceptual boundaries of
electoral mechanics other than to note that the term must encompass (per the Court)
"the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates,
and the voting process." See supra note 15 and accompanying text. For whatever reasons, the Court has not attempted to integrate its campaign finance, gerrymandering,
and electoral mechanics cases into a unified body of law-though there are some recent indications of a convergence between the electoral mechanics and campaigncontribution-limit case law. See infra Part II.C.3.
43 126 S. Ct. 2479
(2006).
45
46
47

Id. at 2492.
Id. at 2492-93.
541 U.S. 267 (2004).
Id. at 344 (Souter,J., dissenting).
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endeavor to create and then to heed relatively simple and objective
indicators for whether something is seriously amiss with the democratic process.
Burdick's "burden" language tends to obscure this, and the obscurity comes at a price. The costs are twofold. First, lower courts confronted with novel electoral mechanics fact patterns have often failed
to apprehend and explore the tools already (or arguably) available to
them for choosing scrutiny levels. For example, in the new voter participation litigation, the lower courts have largely failed to develop
and apply explicitly intent-informed standards of review, even though
such an approach is plausibly invited by Supreme Court precedents.
This failure is not for want of concern about constitutionally aberrant
purposes. In the second round of the Common Cause/Georgia litigation, for example, the district court made a point of detailing the contentious partisan history of Georgia's photo ID requirement before
issuing a preliminary injunction on other grounds.48 In the Seventh
Circuit, Judge Terrence Evans opened his dissent from the court's decision sustaining the Indiana ID law by positing that the requirement
was "a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage election-day turnout
by certain folks believed to skew Democratic." 49 Yet he did not work
this observation into the analytic section of his opinion. 0 Judge Diane
Wood, dissenting from the Seventh Circuit's denial of rehearing en
banc, did suggest, briefly, an intent-informed standard of review, 5 ' but
she failed to ground this doctrinally in anything more than a passing

See Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Common Cause/Ga. 11), 439 F. Supp.
2d 1294,
1304-06 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
49 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949,
954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans,J., dissenting).
" Rather, toward the end of his opinionJudge Evans sought to justify heightened
scrutiny on the basis of his sense that the law would make voting "significantly more
difficult for some eligible voters"-mostly those who are "poor, elderly, minorities, disabled, or some combination thereof." Id. at 955-97. His sense that the law would have
this effect was perhaps grounded in his attribution of exclusionary purposes to the
Indiana legislature. But he did not make the connection explicit, nor did he offer an
account of the circumstances under which judges may properly infer partisan exclusionary intent when it is not admitted.
51 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 484
F.3d 436, 437 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Wood, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen there is a serious risk that an election law has been
passed with the intent of imposing an additional significant burden on the right to
vote of a specific group of voters, the court must apply strict scrutiny." (emphasis
added)).
48
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observation that Burdick distinguishes between "severe" and "reason52
able, nondiscriminatory" restrictions for standard-of-review purposes.
If one cost of Burdick's obscuring heuristic is lower courts' unawareness of doctrinal moves already available to them, the other lies
in their failure to contribute to the development of new techniques,
broadly congruent with the Supreme Court's analytic approaches in
the Burdick family of cases, for policing potentially abusive electoral
mechanics. Novel fact patterns should provide the impetus for doctrinal innovation, but in the new voter participation litigation, the
lower courts have come up short. Misdirected by the burden metaphor, the lower courts have made little effort to create new proxies"as objective as we can make them"-for sorting challenged election
laws into the presumptively permissible and presumptively impermissible categories. This failure to test out new techniques for structuring
judicial review of electoral mechanics constricts the flow of information and ideas to the Supreme Court, and ultimately makes for a
poorer body of election law.
The present Article, written with the hope of prompting litigants
and lower courts (as well as academics) to engage more productively
with the Burdickjurisprudence, provides an integrative account of the
Supreme Court's techniques for setting scrutiny levels in electoral mechanics cases. Part I puts Burdick in context, briefly explaining the history of and the rationale for the severe-burden threshold test. Part II
documents and typologizes the strategies now available, or arguably
available, to lower courts for determining the presumptive constitutional status of challenged requirements. I pay special attention to
strategies that the Court has only gestured toward (and I take note of
related tensions and inconsistencies where they exist), for it is by
elaborating possibilities at the doctrinal margins that the lower courts
may affect the shape of election law in the years ahead. Part III illustrates the ideas developed in Part II with a look at three district court
opinions concerning Georgia's photo ID requirements for voting. I
sketch a few preliminary ideas about new techniques, consistent with
the formalist tendencies and partly structural purposes of the Burdick
jurisprudence, that lower courts might test out in such cases. I also
offer some suggestions for how the Supreme Court could facilitate

52

Id. at 437-38 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1991)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). There is, I shall suggest, much to be said for grounding
heightened scrutiny on indicia of impermissible purposes, see infta Parts lI.C and III.A,
butJudge Wood's opinion makes little headway in developing this idea.
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this. (I have relegated the bulk of my prescriptive project, however, to
future articles. My contribution in this Article is principally diagnostic
and descriptive.)
I. BURDICKIN CONTEXT: THE PROBLEM OFJUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ELECTORAL MECHANICS
Some laws that burden voting or political association rights garner
strict scrutiny. Many others receive very deferential judicial review.
On first glance, it may be puzzling that any class of laws that materially burdens fundamental rights would receive light-touch judicial
53

review.
But judicial review of election laws presents a distinctive set
of challenges.
The Supreme Court has long maintained, for example, that deferential review of electoral mechanics is generally appropriate because, "as a practical matter, there must be substantial regulation of
elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order,
rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes. " 54 To
achieve these "necessary objectives," the Court later explained,
States have enacted comprehensive and sometimes complex election
codes. Each provision of these schemes, whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects-at least to some degree-the individual's right to vote and his right to associate with others
for political ends.
Under these circumstances, too much judicial scrutiny would be
bad medicine. As the Court put it in Burdick: "[T]o subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.., would tie
the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently."5 6
The point can be put more dramatically: too much judicial involvement could itself burden the fundamental rights to vote and as-

53 But see Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue
Burden Analysis in ConstitutionalDoctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 955-56 (1994) (suggesting that some
type of limiting threshold inquiry into the nature and extent of burdens on fundamental rights becomes a practical and political necessity insofar as the Constitution is interpreted to protect a broad range of interests).
54 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730
(1974).
55 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
56 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
433 (1992).
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sociate for political change.57 One danger, alluded to in Burdick, is os58
sification.
If judges narrowly circumscribe what is permissible, the
constitutionalization of election law threatens to forestall the very
forms of experimentation that could make the right to vote more
readily exercised and more effective as a source of public accountability. A second danger is electoral confusion. The Supreme Court recently suggested, for example, that the issuance of an injunction
shortly before an election could disrupt voters', candidates', and pollworkers' expectations; the ensuing logistical snafus and disarray could
well result in lost votes and turned-away voters. 59 Third, too much judicial second-guessing of legislators' election law handiwork might, on
the margins, lead sincere, policy-minded lawmakers to devote their
energies to other subjects. 6° Deterrence of legislative activity is welcome insofar as the constitutional costs of the deterred activity are
likely to be high and the benefits low. But because the effective exercise of the right to vote depends on supportive legislation-legislation
to facilitate access to the polls, to guard against fraud, to foster informative political campaigns, to ensure that voters have a decent range
of choices, and more-deterrence of legislative activity in this area
probably should not be invited unless the courts can narrowly target
"bad" activity.
All of this warrants judicial caution and circumspection when
courts are asked to adjudicate claims that a state's electoral mechanics
unduly burden the right to vote. But it does not warrant abdication,
for there is also the risk, as Ely and others since have emphasized, that
the "ins" will use their power over the ground rules of political competition to keep the "outs" out.6 The critical and enormously difficult
problem for the Supreme Court, then, is to elaborate a doctrinal
framework that empowers lower courts to police abusive electoral re57 Cf Brownstein, supra note 53, at 919 (arguing that the deferential
"balancing"
standard of review under Burdick should be reserved for "laws serving some uniquely
important, [election-related] interest, such as the special goals of electoral equity and
efficiency"; other laws that burden voting or associational rights would receive strict
scrutiny).
58 Worries about election law ossification have been
a persistent theme in the prescriptive doctrinal work of Richard Hasen. See, e.g., HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND
ELECTION LAW, supra note 39, at 101-56 (arguing that Supreme Court deference to legislative value judgments is appropriate, and would remove the danger of ossification).
59 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct.
5, 7 (2006).
60Christopher S. Elmendorf, Election Commissions and Electoral Reform: An
Overview,
5 ELECTION LJ. 425, 438-39 (2006).
61 See, e.g.,
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1980).
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forms, while giving legislators plenty of room for constructive tinkering and experimentation. Hence Burdick, which tries to thread the
needle thus:
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh the
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate
against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for
the burden imposed by its rle, taking into consideration the extent to
which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.
Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights....
[W]hen those rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the regulation
must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. But when a state election law provision imposes only reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.
Notice two things about this passage. First, the burden on rights
fairly attributable to an election law is nominally decisive in setting
scrutiny levels. Benefits will matter at the justification stage, but for
scrutiny level purposes, burdens are all that count.63 Second, while

6

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (citations omitted) (internal quo-

tation marks omitted).
6S Alan

Brownstein has argued, on the contrary, that the juxtaposition of "severe"

and "reasonable, nondiscriminatory" restrictions in this passage means that Burdick
contemplates strict scrutiny not only for laws whose impact is severe, but also for "laws
that serve impermissible (i.e., discriminatory) goals or that burden rights beyond the
state's legitimate need to manage the conduct of elections." Brownstein, supra note
53, at 918. His is not, I think, an intuitive reading. In the first paragraph I have
quoted, the Court clearly distinguishes between regulatory "burdens" and public benefits ('justifications"). It is therefore odd to read the Court's use of the term "severe
restrictions" in the next paragraph (defined with reference to "the extent to which
[the] challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights," Burdick,
504 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added), as impliedly encompassing the state purpose behind

and the public benefits of the challenged law. Moreover, Brownstein's reading converts strict scrutiny into a conclusion (equivalent to a holding of unconstitutionality),
rather than treating it as a standard of review. Yet in the electoral mechanics context,
strict scrutiny need not be "fatal in fact." See infra text accompanying notes 113-118
(explaining "best practices strict scrutiny"). And for what it's worth, in the cases fol-

lowing Burdick, the Supreme Court has almost universally begun by characterizing the
burden as severe or slight before turning to the state's asserted justifications for the
law. See infra note 66.
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Burdick makes clear that "severe" burdens will be met with strict scrutiny, the quoted passage is ambiguous concerning the standard of review properly applied in nonsevere-burden cases. To say that "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" are generally justified by the
state's "important regulatory interests" 64 is to beg the question of how
closely the reviewing court should examine the state's asserted regulatory interests (to see if they are "important") or the law's restrictions
(to see if they are "reasonable" and "nondiscriminatory"). The Supreme Court has not done much to resolve this ambiguity, and a full
investigation of the matter would take us well beyond the scope of this
Article. 6 ' For now, suffice it to say that the Supreme Court typically
applies something like rational basis review in nonsevere-burden
cases, but that the rationality standard may not be quite so lax as the
one applied to ordinary economic and social legislation; also, to the
extent that the burden is fairly characterized as "significant," if not
quite "severe," some intermediate form of scrutiny may be in order. 66
Although I disagree with Brownstein concerning the most natural, face-value reading of Burdick, I agree with him that the electoral mechanics case law, taken as a whole,
does invite arguments from legislative purpose. See infra Part II.C.
64 Burdick, 504
U.S. at 434.
65 I shall have something to say about discriminatory
but nonsevere burdens in
Part II.C.2, infra.
Since Burdick, in every case but one in which the Court has assayed the burden
of an election law for standard-of-review purposes, it has characterized the burden as
either "severe" or "slight" (sometimes "minor" or "trivial"). If the Court deems the
burden slight, it proceeds with de facto rational basis review. The Court omits the
magic words "rational basis," and it generally does not cite to foundational examples of
anything-passes review like Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483
(1955), but neither does it seriously probe the connection between the state's asserted
interests and the regulations at issue. The Court has repeatedly excused the state of
any obligation to come forward with empirical evidence to justify burdens characterized as minor. See, e.g., Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1986)
("We have never required a State to make a particularized showing of the existence of
voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies prior to
the imposition of reasonable restrictions on ballot access"); cf HASEN, THE SUPREME
COURT AND ELECTION LAW, supra note 39, at 96 ("The common thread [in ballotaccess and related cases] is that although the Court appears to have 'balanced' [interests], the 'balancing' lowered the level of scrutiny to be applied whenever the Court
viewed the ballot-access rules (or rules governing minor parties) as imposing only a
small burden on the parties.").
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party was the exceptional case in which the Court
deemed the burden at issue-Minnesota's ban on fusion candidacies-"not severe" yet
"not trivial." 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997). Having so characterized the burden, however,
the Court attached no apparent significance to its intermediate status. Timmons sustained the fusion ban on the basis of a hypothetical parade of horribles. See id. at 36465 ("[I]ts fusion ban is justified by its interests in avoiding voter confusion, promoting
candidate competition... , preventing electoral distortions and ballot manipulations,
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and discouraging party splintering and 'unrestrained factionalism.'"). The Court did
not require Minnesota to come forward with any empirical evidence to back up the
claimed connection between the fusion ban and the state's legitimate interests, nor did
the Court concern itself with how fusion candidacies actually affect the political process in the states that accommodates the practice. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States To Protect the Democrats and Republicansfrom Political Competition, 1997 SuP. CT. REV. 331 (discussing the
significance of Timmons).
Timmons might be thought to stand for the proposition that rational basis is the
true (albeit de facto) standard of review for all electoral mechanics cases in which the
burden at issue has not been shown to be severe. But this position is untenable. For
one, if the Court had really meant to consign all nonsevere burdens to rational basis
scrutiny, it probably would have said as much. More importantly, ever since Storer, the
Court has emphasized that its standard of review in election law cases is "flexible." As
the Court put it in Burdick, "the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state
election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights." 504 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added). The word
"extent" connotes a spectrum of relevant variation, not a binary divide. So too does
Burdick's oddly circumspect and circular suggestion that in nonsevere-burden cases,
"reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" will "generally" be justified by "important
regulatory interests." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). At the very least, this
invites plaintiffs to argue that the restriction at issue is "unreasonable," "discriminatory," or inadequately tied to "important" state interests-and hence unconstitutional
even if not severely burdensome. See infra Part II.C (exploring ways in which discriminatory intent affects the standard of review); cf. Brownstein, supra note 53, at 917-19
(1994) (proposing that Burdick is best interpreted as impliedly providing for three tiers
of review: strict scrutiny for severe and/or intentionally discriminatory burdens, intermediate balancing for significant but not severe or discriminatory burdens, and rational basis for slight, nondiscriminatory burdens).
Finally, there is the puzzle of Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), which found an
Equal Protection violation in the recount order of the Florida Supreme Court following the 2000 presidential election. The Florida court had specified that the "intent of
the voter" was to guide the recounting of ballots, but the court did not "formulat[e]
uniform rules" and "specific standards" to ensure the "equal application" of the intentof-the-voter principle. Bush, 531 U.S. at 105-06. As a result, recount practices varied
from one county to the next, and even within counties as the recount progressed. See
id. at 106-09 (discussing the practices of Miami-Dade County, Palm Beach County, and
Broward County). Bush deemed this inconsistent treatment of ballots to contravene
the Constitution's "rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental
fairness" with respect to voting. Id. at 109.
Among the many puzzling features of Bush is that it does not even cite to the
Storer-Burdick line of cases, notwithstanding that recount procedures would seem to be
paradigmatic electoral mechanics regulations. Nor does the opinion explain the applicable standard of review. Rather, Bush posits only that the state has an "obligation
to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members of its electorate." Id. at 105.
It was feasible to set discretion-confining rules for the recounting of ballots, and the
Florida court had failed to do so-end of story. (Justice Souter, explaining his agreement with the plurality's Equal Protection holding, said he could "conceive of no legitimate state interest served by" applying different rules for ascertaining the intent of
the voter "to identical types of ballots used in identical brands of machines and exhibiting identical physical characteristics." Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting). This is of
course a stretch-the Florida court might well have pointed to its lack of expertise, the
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Whatever Burdick's ambiguities, the case does appear to mark a
transition in the Court's thinking about judicial review of electoral
mechanics. Burdick's roots trace to a 1974 decision, Storer v. Brown, 7
in which the Court backed off its brief experiment with exacting scrutiny of election laws in favor of a much mushier sort of scrutiny. According to Storer:
[There is] no litmus-paper test for separating those [electoral] restrictions that are valid from those that are invidious under the Equal Protection Clause.... [There] is no substitute for the hard judgments that
must be made. Decision in this context.., is very much a "matter of degree," very much a matter of "consider[ing] the facts and circumstances
behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and
the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification." What
the result of this process will be in any specific case may be very difficult
to predict with great assurance.68

Burdick can be seen as an attempt to impose a restraining structure upon the mush of "no litmus-paper test" review, by conditioning
serious judicial scrutiny on proof of a severe burden. Although Burdick purported merely to restate the then-governing doctrine, Storers
progeny had not always featured a threshold, scrutiny-leveldetermining inquiry into burden severity. Consider DemocraticParty of
69
United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, for example, a 1981 decision striking down Wisconsin's requirement that the state's delegations to presidential nominating conventions vote in accordance with
the results of the state's open primary. Wisconsin contended that this

press of time, or other factors as a "conceivable rational basis" for leaving the design of
recount rules to local canvassing boards. So like the plurality, Souter was applying
some form of moderately heightened scrutiny.)
Bush is extremely hard to make sense of if one understands the application of
heightened judicial scrutiny-anything more than the vacuous rational basis review
applied to economic legislation-to depend on the plaintiff first demonstrating a "significant" or "severe" burden. There had been no showing in Bush that any county canvassing board was using demonstrably inferior recount rules. But Bush's failure to discuss Burdick, and the Court's use of marginally heightened scrutiny, is unobjectionable
if the state is understood to have a minimal obligation to avoid arbitrarily disparate
treatment of participants in the political process, without regard to demonstrable consequences or burdens. Put differently, the import of Bush may be that "rational basis
plus," rather than ordinary rational basis, is the default standard of review in electoral
mechanics cases.
67 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
68 Id. at 730 (alteration to internal quotation in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 403 U.S. 330, 348 (1972) and Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 30 (1968)).
69 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
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mandate placed only a "minor burden" on the national Democratic
Party; the Party disagreed, calling the burden "substantial. 7 ° Instead
of sifting through the evidence and arguments on this point, Justice
Stewart's opinion for the majority proclaimed:
[I]t is not for the courts to mediate the merits of this dispute [about the
magnitude of the burden]. For even if the State were correct, a State, or
a court, may not constitutionally substitute its own judgment for that of
the Party. A political party's choice among the various ways of determining the makeup of a State's delegation
to the party's national convention
71
is protected by the Constitution.

In short, under La Follette,heightened scrutiny applies whether the
burden is big or small. What matters is the fact of infringement on a

constitutionally protected interest, not the severity of the infringement.72
That the Court itself understands Burdick to have marked a doctrinal transition is suggested by Justice Thomas's opinion for the sixjustice majority in Clingman v. Beaver,73 the most recent decision applying the Burdick framework. In Clingman, the Libertarian Party of
Oklahoma (LPO) challenged state rules that disallowed political parties from inviting citizens to vote in the party's primary if they were
registered members of another party. The LPO had argued that the
case was controlled by Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,7 4 a
1986 decision in which the Court applied strict scrutiny and struck
down a statute barring political parties from inviting independents to
vote in their primaries. But the Clingman Court had harsh words for
Tashjian. The Court criticized Tashjian for "appl[ying] strict scrutiny
with little discussion of the magnitude of the burdens imposed. 7 5
Tashjian was said to be in tension with later cases that "clarified [that]
strict scrutiny is appropriate only if the burden is severe. 76
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court has sought to impose
some order on the vagaries of "no litmus paper test" scrutiny. Ifjudi-

Id. at 123.
Id. at 123-24 (footnote omitted).
72 Cf id. at 138 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority for "upholding a
First Amendment claim by one of the two major parties without any serious inquiry
into the extent of the burden on associational freedoms").
73 544 U.S. 581 (2005).
74 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
75 Clingman, 544 U.S. at 591 (emphasis added). Justice Thomas spoke
for a sixJustice majority in this portion of his opinion.
76 Id. at 592.
70

71

334

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 156:313

cial review of electoral mechanics regularly entailed open-ended
weighing of "the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests
which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who
are disadvantaged by the classification, 77 the Supreme Court would
have no small amount of difficulty controlling lower-court interventions in the political process. It probably would not redound to the
credit of the judiciary or the quality of the electoral process if lower
courts freely intervened-or declined to intervene-on the basis of
each judge's personal conception of what is good or reasonable or fair
in matters of election law. There is also the danger that, in Justice
Kennedy's cryptic words, the courts would end up "assuming political,
not legal, responsibility for a process that often produces ill will and
distrust."78 Justice Kennedy penned those words in warning against
judicial review of partisan gerrymandering absent "rules to limit and
confine judicial intervention, '"" but his point is more general. Judicial
intervention in the political process can have partisan effects, and
those who oppose particular instances of judicial intervention are
wont to accuse the courts of intending such effects. Accordingly,
there is an ever-present danger that the courts' reputation for political
neutrality-a reputation on which public support for the judiciary
probably depends-will founder on the shoals of judicial intervention
in the political process."s This risk seems particularly acute, as Justice
Kennedy suggests, where judicial intervention is highly discretionary,
unconfined by clear rules.

Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (quoting Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 30 (1968)).
78 Vieth v.Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (Kennedy,J., concurring).
77

79
8o

Id.
Cf Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 153-58 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (predicting

damage to the Court's reputation resulting from its disposition of this case). But see
James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000:
Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT.J. POL. SCI. 535, 542-43 (2003) (finding that
the decision had little impact on "diffuse support" for the Supreme Court). In other
contexts, the Court has sometimes linked its holdings, rules, or rhetoric to anxieties
about public confidence in judicial impartiality. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 407 (1989) ("The legitimacy of the judicial Branch ultimately depends on its
reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship. That reputation may not be borrowed by the political Branches to cloak their work in the neutral colors ofjudicial action."); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("[The requirements of due process]
may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very
best to weigh the scales ofjustice equally between contending parties. But to perform
its high function in the best way justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice."') (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
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II. UNDERSTANDING BURDICK: How THE COURT POLICES ELECTORAL
MECHANICS (WITHOUT MUCH DATA)

The thesis that Burdick marked a doctrinal transition, and that
scrutiny levels in electoral mechanics cases now depend on the magnitude of the burden fairly attributable to the challenged law, is correct
in one respect but importantly mistaken in others. The approach to
judicial review connoted by Burdick's statement of black-letter law
bears only a passing resemblance to the Supreme Court's practice,
pre- or post-Burdick.
As we have seen, what Burdick appears to prescribe is an approach
to judicial review with three distinguishing characteristics. First, not all
electoral mechanics will face the same degree of judicial scrutinyrather, scrutiny levels will depend on the outcome of a threshold inquiry. Second, the threshold inquiry will entail sifting through empirical data concerning the actual workings of the challenged law, so that
the "magnitude" (as well as the "character") of the burden on voting or
political association rights can be determined."' Third, although Burdick's formulation of the threshold test does not address baselines or
metrics for measuring burdens, or even indicate whether "burden" is to
be understood in individualistic or group-based
.
.. .82
.terms, Burdick's lanapproach.
guage of rights arguably connotes an individualistic
Since Burdick, the Court has made a point of first characterizing
burden severity and then stating the scrutiny level before moving on
to assess the challenged law's tailoring and the state interests presented on the law's behalf.8 3 Prior to Burdick, as Justice Thomas suggested in Clingman, the Court occasionally proceeded with heightened

81

Cf Michael Waterstone, Constitutional and Statutory Voting Rights for People with

Disabilities, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 353, 371-75 (2003) (inferring from the Court's
rhetoric in Burdick and associated cases that empirical questions about the "extent" to
which "the right to vote [is] affected" would figure centrally in the disposition of contemplated voting-procedure challenges brought by people with disabilities).
82 Cf Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 39, at 670-74 (treating Burdick as emblematic
of the Court's putative focus on individual rights rather than structure in political
process cases). I disagree with this reading of the substance of the Court's decision in
Burdick, see infta notes 162-171 and accompanying text, but it is a fair inference from
Burdick's nominal "burden on rights" prescription for setting scrutiny levels (given the
individualistic thrust of most fundamental rights adjudication).
83 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. The notable exception is Bush v.
Gore, which does not even mention Burdick. On reconciling Bush with the Burdickjurisprudence, see supra note 66.
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scrutiny from the outset.8 4 It is to this extent, and only to this extent,
that Burdick may be said to mark a change in the Supreme Court's
electoral mechanics jurisprudence.
As for the rest of the process connoted by "the Burdick test," it is a
good ways removed from the Court's typical practice. Rather than inquiring into the actual effects of challenged laws on voting or political
association, the Court tends to favor inquiries that turn on the form of
the challenged law, the law's congruity or incongruity with the surrounding legal landscape, and, arguably, the intent of the enacting
legislative body. Where the Court does consider effects at the threshold stage, it has developed easy-to-measure proxies for the normatively
relevant effect, and uses these proxies to focus and simplify judicial
inquiry.
The underlying concerns that drive the Court's electoral mechanics interventions are not easy to decipher, nor are they likely to be unitary, but it is hard to make sense of the case law in conventional, individualistic terms. This body of law is not designed to enable the
citizen or political organization that suffers a material burden to haul
the state into court and make it provide a substantial justification for
the imposition. The decisions are more readily understood as imperfect efforts to ensure that electoral systems manifest certain properties
in the aggregate.
On balance, it would be apt to describe the Court's practice in this
way: laws pertaining to electoral mechanics carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, even though they touch upon the fundamental rights of voting and political association. As the Court said early
on, in Storer, "it is very unlikely that all or even a large portion of the
state election laws would fail to pass muster under our cases., 5 Most
such laws therefore receive highly deferential review. Sometimes,
however, an inspection of the challenged law's form and context, informed by common sense and easy-to-measure-and-classify proxies for
impact, reveals something alarming. If so, the presumption of constitutionality may be reversed, and the Court will take a close look at the

See Cling'man v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 591-92 (2005). In my view, the pre-Burdick
cases that are now (arguably) anomalous include not only Tashjian and La Follette, see
supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text, but also Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979), and, possibly, Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780 (1983). However, it is possible that some or all of these cases could be saved
through revisionist accounts of the basis of which the Court applied heightened scrutiny. Cf infra notes 104, 288-289, and accompanying text.
85 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730
(1974).
84
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law's tailoring and the justifications asserted for it. Though the Court
uses the language of "burdens" in explaining reversals of the presumption of constitutionality, this language is generally opportunistic.
When the Court says that an election law effects a "severe" burden, it
is propounding a conclusion-that the ordinary presumption of constitutionality should be flipped-rather than explaining the basis for
that conclusion.
The balance of this Part surveys and explains the principal stratagems that the Court has used or invited to overcome the presumption
of constitutionality (while simultaneously limiting the need for complicated empirical inquiries). There are three basic strategies. First,
treat a burden as severe in kind, whatever its magnitude or practical effect. Second, define presumptive, formal cutoffs concerning how far a
state may go with regulations that are not severe in kind. These cutoffs are formal in the sense that what is measured is not the ultimate
object of concern, but rather some feature of the law itself or some
easily ascertained proxy for its impact. There is considerable variety
within this approach: cutoffs may be numerical or qualitative, for example, and they may be grounded upon bare judicial intuitions about
what is necessary for the political process to work well, or on comparisons to analogous laws across states and over time. The third strategy
for flipping the presumption of permissibility is to substitute an inquiry into the purpose of the statute for an inquiry into its effects. After
canvassing these techniques, I shall take up the question of what role
remains for empirical inquiry at the threshold, scrutiny-leveldetermining stage ofjudicial review.
Before plunging into the cases, let me stress a further point about
the nature and the subject of my argument in this Part. My analysis is
interpretive and constructive. It attempts to impose some order on an
unruly body of law, one that has veered this way and that as the balance of power has shifted amongJustices who have had quite different
ideas about how to approach electoral mechanics cases. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas, for example, had little use for the
threshold inquiry; they stood ready to apply strict scrutiny in any case
in which plaintiffs could show that their political participation was
hindered by the challenged requirement."6 Nor has Justice Stevens

86 This trio dissented in many election law cases at the dawn of the Strerera, and
often thereafter. See, e.g., Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 682 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 688 (1973) (Marshall,J., dissenting); Rosario
v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 763 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting); O'Brien v. Skinner,
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been a fan of the threshold inquiry, though in contrast to the Marshall/Brennan/Douglas camp, Stevens
has sometimes preferred open7
ended balancing to strict scrutiny.8
Yet consistently since the time of Burdick and not infrequently before then, the center of the Court has thought that laws governing the
mechanics of the electoral process carry a strong presumption of
permissibility, and that heightened scrutiny must be predicated on
some sort of threshold showing that overcomes this presumption. In
recognition of this, my primary goal in this Part is to identify, explain,
and provide a nomenclature for the strategies that the Court has used,
either pre- or post-Burdick, to remove election laws from the presumptively permissible category. It will be useful to develop a shared vocabulary for what the Court has done, even if the Court's choice of
one strategy or another is not always explicable, and even if the
Court's interventions do not uniformly reflect a common purpose.
A. "Burdens"Severe in Kind
Laws that expressly regulate privileged aspects of the political process, or that use certain disfavored regulatory tools, have been deemed to
effect a severe burden as a matter of law regardless of consequences.
Strict scrutiny will follow. The Court has never hinted that the burden
presumption associated with these types of laws is rebuttable. Thus, we
may describe the burden as severe in kind. Strict scrutiny applies because
of the character of the burden, not the magnitude.
A paradigm illustration of the in-kind approach to the characterization of burdens is Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,ss a decision that predates Burdick by three years but that the
Court has repeatedly cited with approval since."" A unanimous deci-

414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974) (Marshall,J., dissenting); Storer, 415 U.S. at 755 (Brennan,J.,
dissenting).
87 This is a theme of Stevens's jurisprudence generally.
See Andrew M. Siegel,
Equal Protection Unmodified: JusticeJohn Paul Stevens and the Casefor Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2339, 2340 (2006) (stating that Justice Stevens's equal protection methodology disfavors "the use of tiers of review, multi-factor
balancing tests, or any other mediating doctrine"). Perhaps the best example in the
electoral mechanics jurisprudence is Stevens's opinion for a five-Justice majority in
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
88 489 U.S. 214
(1989).
89 See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 359-60
(1997)
(approving of Eu's protections for "political parties' internal affairs and core associational activities"); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (2000) (approving
of Eu for "vigorously affirm[ing] the special place the First Amendment reserves for,
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sion,' ° Eu struck down various California regulations of the internal
structure and governance of political parties, as well as a ban on the
endorsement of candidates by party-governing bodies. 9' California
contended that the burden of the endorsement ban was "miniscule";

the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the party structure regulations "directly implicate the associational rights of political parties and
their members."9 2 (The Court also stressed that the endorsement ban
"directly affects speech which 'is at the core of our electoral process
and of the First Amendment freedoms."' 93 ) The Court did not predicate heightened scrutiny on evidence of, for example, the relative efficacy of California political parties pre- and post-enactment of the challenged laws; or on the comparative experience of political parties in
California and other states; or on a record of instances in which California political parties had been thwarted in their efforts to implement a preferred set of internal party governance rules. Instead, the
Court offered conjectures about how a political party might want to
organize itself in the absence of these strictures.94 The only evidence

and the special protection it accords, the process by which a political party 'select[s] a
standard bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and preferences"' (quoting

Eu, 489 U.S. at 224).

90 The case was decided 8-0, with the ChiefJustice not participating.
91

The statutory provisions at issue

dictate[d] the size and composition of the state central committees; set forth
rules governing the selection and removal of committee members; fix[ed] the
maximum term of office for the chair of the state central committee; require[d] that the chair rotate between residents of northern and southern
California; specif[ied] the time and place of committee meetings; and
limit[ed] the dues parties may impose on members.
Eu, 489 U.S. at 218-19 (footnote omitted).
92 Id. at 222,
229.
93 Id. at 222-23 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)); see
also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 209-10 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that any burden on core political speech is subject to strict scrutiny).
94 The court suggested
that
[a] party might decide, for example, that it will be more effective if a greater
number of its official leaders are local activists rather than Washington-based
elected officials. The Code prevents such a change. A party might also decide
that the state central committee chair needs more than two years to successfully formulate and implement policy. The Code prevents such an extension
of the chair's term of office. A party might find that a resident of northern
California would be particularly effective in promoting the party's message
and in unifying the party. The Code prevents her from chairing the state central committee unless the preceding chair was from the southern part of the
State.

340

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 156: 313

of impact to which the opinion referred is that the Libertarian Party
"was forced to abandon its region-based organization in favor of the
statutorily mandated county-based system." 95 Whether this affected
the Libertarian Party's ability to function effectively was not explored.
In-kind burden characterization is not a one-way ratchet. It is the
fate of some burdens to be classified as per se "not severe." Consider
the Court's decision in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party9" (decided five years after Burdick). The Eighth Circuit, relying on secondary historical sources, found that Minnesota's ban on fusion candidacies severely burdened the New Party's associational rights. 97
"[M]inor parties," the circuit court concluded, "have played a significant role in the electoral system where multiple party nomination is
legal, but have no meaningful influence where multiple party nomination is banned."98 Yet at the Supreme Court, neither the majority (per
Justice Rehnquist) nor the dissent (per Justice Stevens) grounded its
burden analysis on evidence of the effectiveness of third parties under
fusion-permitting and fusion-disallowing regimes. Rehnquist deemed
the burden not severe because the fusion ban left the New Party free
to compete with other parties in recruiting candidates; citing Eu, he
stressed that the fusion ban neither regulated the internal organization of the New Party nor debarred the Party from endorsing and
supporting any candidate for public office.9 Stevens, by contrast, asserted that political parties have constitutional rights "to select their
nominees for public office," l°° "to communicate the identity of their
nominees to the voting public," 1)' and, related to this, "to be on the
election ballot."' 1 2 Because the New Party had shown enough support
to qualify for the ballot under Minnesota law, but was prevented from
putting on the ballot "the standard bearer who best represents the
party's ideologies and preferences," the burden of the fusion ban was

Eu, 489 U.S. at 230.
95

96
97

Id. at 230 n.20.
520 U.S. 351 (1997).
Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 197-99 (8th Cir. 1996)

(discussing the history of fusion candidacies in the United States). (A fusion ban prevents political parties from nominating candidates who have agreed to serve as another
party's nominee.)
98 Id. at 199.
99 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 359-63 (citing Eu,
489 U.S. at 223).
100Id. at 371 (StevensJ., dissenting).
10tId.
102 Id. at 373.
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necessarily grave.' 0 3 Like Rehnquist's, Stevens's reasoning was basically axiomatic; the difference is that Stevens would recognize an additional class of severe-in-kind burdens.
Once one sees the category of severe-in-kind burdens, it becomes
easy to assimilate Warren Court strict scrutiny precedents into the
Burdick "sliding scale" paradigm. 0 4 To illustrate, imagine a law that
conditions participation in democratic self-government upon payment
of a fee or ownership of property. Every time the Supreme Court has
confronted such a law, the Court has struck it down. The Court has
ruled that citizens may not be required to pay a fee or tax for the privilege of voting;'°5 that impecunious candidates may not be required to
pay a fee for access to the ballot; ° 6 and that appointive offices may not
be reserved for the propertied classes.'0 7 These holdings all predate
Burdick, but there is little reason to think that they wouldn't be followed today. And the easiest way to explain-using the language of
Burdick-why strict scrutiny properly applies in such cases is to posit

103

Id. at 371-72 (quoting Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S.

214, 224 (1989)). Stevens's opinion displays no interest in the empirical question of
whether minor parties' second-choice nominees (i.e., the nominees chosen under a
fusion ban) tend to less effectively represent the views of party members. There is
something almost disingenuous about Stevens's reasoning: the New Party objected to
the fusion ban not because it prevented the party from finding candidates who would
represent the views of party members as effectively as would the Democratic nominees,
but rather because the fusion ban deprived the New Party of a way of building electoral
support for its "brand" and platform without calling upon voters to waste their votes on
an unelectable candidate.
104 It also becomes feasible to rehabilitate certain post-Warren Court but
preBurdick electoral mechanics cases, such as La Follette, in which the Court said the magnitude of the burden was irrelevant. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La
Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 134 (1981).
105 Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Harper v. Va. State Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); see also Hill v.
Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) (striking down an allegedly trivial property-based franchise
limitation); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (holding that the city
may not reserve franchise to property owners in certain bond referenda). Only if the
"government" in question is a proprietary enterprise will the Court countenance property-based limitations on the franchise. See generally Richard Briffault, Who Rules at
Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 359-84
(1993) (discussing special districts and the model of proprietary government).
106 Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134 (1972).
107 Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989); Chappelle v. Greater Baton
Rouge Airport Dist., 431 U.S. 159 (1977); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). Nominally, the
Court applied rational basis review in these appointments decisions-but that pretense
isjust silly. These cases are much better understood as reflecting a virtually categorical
rule against state efforts to condition political participation upon ownership of property or payment of a fee.
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that the character of the burden (a direct, monetary condition on political participation) demands it.
What drives the classification of certain election laws as severely
burdensome in kind? I am not sure that there is a generic answer;
there is certainly not a doctrinally settled one. In cases like Eu,involving associational rights of political parties, the Court may have acted
on the basis of an ill-considered analogy between political parties and
private clubs. That is the view of Richard Pildes.1' 8 Daniel Lowenstein
sees some of these cases differently, as an effort by the Court to constitutionalize the "responsible party government" school of thought
about the electoral arrangements that best conduce to government
accountability. m
David Schleicher suggests that Eu, Timmons, and
other political party cases have a hidden structural logic, with the
Court promoting values of representation and electoral decisiveness
while taking as a given the fact of single-member districts and firstpast-the-post elections. "0
The Court was more transparent about its purposes in striking
down poll taxes and other economic conditions on the franchise:
protecting the political equality of poor citizens.'
A bright-line rule
against conditioning participation upon payment of a fee or ownership of property represented a convenient, judicially manageable way
of advancing the egalitarian agenda.

108Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalizationof Democratic Politics,
188 HARV. L.
REV. 28, 105-08 (2004).
109Daniel Hays Lowenstein, AssociationalRights of Major PoliticalParties:
A Skeptical
Inquiry, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1741 (1993).
110 David Schleicher, "Politicsas Markets" Reconsidered: Natural Monopolies, Competitive DemocraticPhilosophy and Primary BallotAccess in American Elections, 14 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 163 (2006).
I See, e.g., Lubin, 415 U.S. at 717-18 ("[Even] if the filing fee is more moderate,
as
here, impecunious but serious candidates may be prevented from running.... Whatever may be the political mood at any given time, our tradition has been one of hospitality toward all candidates without regard to their economic status."); Bullock, 405 U.S.
at 144 ("Not only are voters substantially limited in their choice of candidates [by the
candidate filing-fee requirement], but also there is the obvious likelihood that this
limitation would fall more heavily on the less affluent segment of the community,
whose favorites may be unable to pay the large costs required by the Texas system.");
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1966) ("'The Equal Protection Clause demands ...substantially equal state legislative representation for all' .....
The principle that denies the State the right to dilute... vote[s] on account of...
economic status or other such factors by analogy bars a system which excludes those
unable to [or who fail to] pay a fee to vote .. " (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 337 U.S.
553, 568 (1964))).
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B. Cutoffs: From Best PracticesStrict Scrutiny
to StructuralPresumptions
The "severe in kind" strategy for reversing the presumption of
constitutionality papers over problems of degree. Yet problems of degree are pervasive in the regulation of politics. A filing-fee requirement of a couple hundred dollars, for example, probably has a negligible impact on the recruitment of candidates, whereas a fee in the
tens of thousands for a local office might have major consequences
for who decides to run.
In a number of electoral mechanics cases, the Court has sought to
address problems of degree by choosing a simple, verifiable proxy for
the underlying problem, and then subdividing the relevant regulatory
continuum with bright-line cutoffs. Laws that are less demanding
than the cutoff generally receive deferential review while laws above
2
the cutoff will typically be struck down."
To appreciate the distinctive nature of the Storer-Burdickjurisprudence, it is important to distinguish between cutoffs that result from
the application of strict scrutiny in ordinary fundamental rights adjudication, and cutoffs that are chosen on other grounds for the purpose of determining the standard of review. The former is illustrated
by the pre-Storer case of Dunn v. Blumstein.113 Dunn concerned Tennessee's one-year durational residency requirement for voting, which the
state defended as, inter alia, an antifraud device." 4 Applying strict
scrutiny, the Court struck down the one-year requirement, while suggesting that a thirty-day period would pass muster." 5 Dunn stressed
that because state election administrators in Tennessee and elsewhere
had learned to live with a congressionally prescribed thirty-day cap on
residency requirements for presidential elections, and because Tennessee allowed long-time residents to register to vote up to thirty days
before an election, the year-long durational residency requirement for
112

Perhaps the ultimate example of this judicial strategy in the election law area is

the Court's malapportionment jurisprudence (which predates Storer-Burdick, but reflects some of the same impulses). Cf Charles, Democracy and Distortion,supra note 39,
at 671-72 (noting certain bright-line features of the equipopulation cases that make
sense on a structural view, but are hard to understand vis-A-vis the putative dignitary
interest of individual voters).
13 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
114 See id. at 345 ("The main concern is that nonresidents will temporarily invade
the State or county, falsely swear that they are residents to become eligible to vote, and,
by voting, allow a candidate to win by fraud. Surely the prevention of such fraud is a
legitimate and compelling government goal.").
15 Id. at 345-48.
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newcomers could not be necessary to advance the state's compelling
interest in preventing fraud." 6
Dunn represents an application of what I shall term best practices
strict scrutiny of individualrights infringements. The Court begins with an
individualistic understanding of the right to vote: each bona fide citizen resident of a jurisdiction is presumptively entitled to cast a ballot-voting is among her constitutionally protected liberty interests.
The Court then asks whether the plaintiff's exercise of that right has
been materially burdened or curtailed. In Dunn, the answer was unambiguous: Tennessee's durational residency requirement deprived
the plaintiff of his right to vote in the first general election following
his move to Tennessee."' Therefore, it was incumbent on the state to
demonstrate the necessity of the law."" In scrutinizing the state's justification, the Court asks whether the challenged law approximates
the "best" or least burdensome version of its type that has proven
workable in other jurisdictions. Only if it does is the law sustained.
Storer and its progeny use cutoffs in an importantly different way,
which I shall term the model of structuralpresumptions. The Court begins with an idea, perhaps inchoate, of certain qualities that a normative regime of election law should exhibit. If those qualities would be
hard for judges to measure directly and consistently, the Court then
dreams up an easily observed proxy, and defines a cutoff in terms of
that proxy. Laws that fall to one side of the cutoff are presumptively
constitutional and receive generally deferential review; laws on the
other side are presumptively impermissible. The resulting jurisprudence is structural rather than individualistic in the following sense: it
aims to create regimes of election law that display certain properties
in the aggregate, rather than to ensure that state-created burdens on
the individual citizen's fundamental political liberties are justified in

116

Id.

Though this exclusion is unambiguously significant on an individualistic
understanding of the right to vote, it might not be judged important on an aggregative,
representation- or governance-oriented conceptualization of the right to vote. The
significance of the "burden" on such views might be thought to depend on (1) the
number of newcomers, (2) whether newcomers have less information about the subject of the election than old-timers, (3) whether newcomers share distinct political
views or interests, or (4) whether some groups of citizens move more frequently than
other groups over the course of their lifetimes. Cf Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 VA. L. REV. 361 (2007).
18 For what our constitutional practice ultimately guarantees
is not the citizen's right
to exercise fundamental rights, but rather the citizen's entitlement to make the state provide a substantial justification for limitations on her exercise of fundamental rights.
17
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light of the feasible or imaginable alternatives. The language of "burdens" remains, but it is little more than window dressing for conclusions reached on other grounds." 9
Picking cutoffs is an audacious undertaking for the Supreme
Court. In some areas, the Court has simply propounded a cutoff, presumably on the basis of the Justices' hunches. More recently, the
Court has looked to the practices of the states, and has begun to lay a
doctrinal foundation for dynamic cutoffs that could vary as the states'
practices change over time.
1. Fixed, Numerical Cutoffs: On Storer v. Brown and
Signature Requirements for Ballot Access
As in so many areas of election law, the Court's ballot-access jurisprudence began with a couple of vague and indefinite decisions, followed by a much more ambitious and prescriptive effort to structure
judicial review by the lower courts. 20 The two early cases, Williams v.
22
Rhodes 121 and Jenness v. Fortson,1
established that ballot-access laws
could not be used to "freeze the political status quo," 2 but that states
were free to require a "preliminary showing of a significant modicum
of support before printing the name of a... candidate on the ballot." 124 Some such showing was thought appropriate to protect the
state's "important" interest in "avoiding confusion, deception, and
" 5
even frustration of the democratic process at the general election. 12
Williams struck down a medley of Ohio ballot-access regulations that,
taken together, had made it "virtually impossible for a new political
party... to be placed on the [presidential] ballot."126 Among other
things, Ohio required third parties "to obtain petitions signed by

"9 Cf Charles, Democracy and Distortion, supra note
39, at 655-64 (arguing that
much of the Supreme Court's malapportionment and racial gerrymandering jurisprudence reflects a similar effort to pursue structural objectives while using the language
of individual rights).
120 Regarding this pattern in other areas of the Supreme Court's
election law ju-

risprudence, see HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECrION LAW, supra note 39, at
47-72.
122

393 U.S. 23 (1968).
403 U.S. 431 (1971).

123

Id. at 438 (contrasting the facts of Williams, in which minor parties and inde-

121

pendents had been frozen out, with the facts of the instant case, which revealed the
"open quality" of the electoral regime at issue).
124 Id. at 442.
125
126

Id.
Williams, 393 U.S. at 24.
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qualified electors totaling 15% of the number of ballots cast in the last
preceding gubernatorial election." 2 7 In Jenness, the Court upheld
Georgia's requirement that independent candidates procure signatures from 5% of the electorate to qualify for the ballot. 128 The Court
noted that Georgia gave candidates a generous six-month period in
which to comply with the signature requirement; that Georgia did not
impose many of the disabling restrictions found elsewhere; and, perhaps most important, that the recent track record of independent
candidate success demonstrated that the Georgia system's "open quality" was "far from merely theoretical."'29
At issue in Storer were California ballot-access laws which, inter
alia, imposed a one-year disaffiliation requirement on independent
candidates;13 required independent candidates to gather signatures
from registered voters totaling 5% of the number who had voted in
the last general election; and disqualified anyone who had voted in a
primary election from signing an independent's petition for the corresponding general election ballot. 13
If the Court had been doing Dunn-style fundamental rights adjudication in Storer, the inquiry would have begun with the observation
that the disaffiliation requirement and the 5% signature rule both
limited the ability of bona fide independent candidates and their supporters to associate through the ballot. If this form of association
were deemed to fall within the ambit of the First Amendment, the
Court would next have asked whether the state had evidence that the
signature and disaffiliation requirements advanced the policy objectives invoked on their behalf, and whether other states had managed
to protect similar interests in less burdensome or more narrowly tailored ways. The challenged requirements would be struck down
unless California could show that they materially advanced the state
interests asserted in their defense, and that they better served those
interests than 1 the
less burdensome or better tailored alternatives in
32
use elsewhere.

127

Id. at 24-25.

403 U.S. at 438.
Id. at 438-39.
130 That is, independent candidates were required to sever
their political party ties
a full year before running as independents.
131 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,
726-27 (1974).
12 The reasoning of the Storerdissenters largely follows
the Dunn model. See id. at
755-66 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
18Jenness,
29
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But the analysis in Storer unfolded rather differently. The Court
made short work of the challenge to the disaffiliation requirement,
remarking, "It appears obvious to us that the... disaffiliation provision
furthers the state's interest in the stability of its political system." 133
The Court did not require the state to come forward with supporting
evidence, nor did the Court explore the feasibility of less burdensome
alternatives, much to the dissent's dismay.134
Then the Court turned to the signature requirement. With a nod
toJenness, the Court began by observing that the "percentage [5%] ...
does not appear to be excessive. " 135 However, "to assess realistically
whether the law imposes excessively burdensome requirements," it
would be necessary to know the size of the "available pool of possible
signers."'' 6 Because California disqualified primary voters from signing independent candidate petitions, a candidate who set out to
gather the requisite number of signatures (5% of the total vote in the
last election) might have to sign up "substantially more than 5% of the
eligible pool."13 7 That would make the constitutional claim "not frivolous." 38 But it wouldn't be the end of the story either; the ultimate

"question for judgment" would be: "[I]n the context of California
politics, could a reasonably diligent independent candidate be expected to satisfy the signature requirements, or will it be only rarely
that the unaffiliated candidate will succeed in getting on the ballot?' '

39

Lest answering this question prove too difficult, however, the

Supreme Court advised on remand that "[i]f the required signatures
approach 10% of the eligible pool of voters," the lower court should
assess the feasibility of modifying California's signature-gathering
rules, or even strike down the rules tout de suite. 40 In effect, the Court
dictated that a 10%-of-the-available-pool requirement would be presumed to prevent reasonably diligent independent candidates from
qualifying more than rarely.
Storer is emblematic of the model of structural presumptions in
two respects. First, the Court constitutionalized an end-state (a per-

133Id. at 736 (emphasis added).

134 See id. at 760-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling for
an examination of less
burdensome alternatives).
135 Id. at
738.
136 Id. at 738-39.
137 Id. at
739.
138 Id. at
740.
139 Id. at 742.
140 Id. at 743-44.
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formance standard, as it were) for the electoral system as a whole. It
sought to ensure that the system was open enough for independent
candidates to get on the ballot more than rarely. If the aggregate
property of adequate openness was satisfied, the Court would not further concern itself with whether the remaining burdens on the right
to associate through the ballot were truly justified.14 1 Storer is also emblematic in that the Court set forth cutoffs (using a simple proxy) to
reduce the need for empirical inquiry into complicated questions
about the actual openness of ballot-access regimes. Signature requirements (measured as the share of the "available pool") were
treated as a proxy for openness; requirements of 5% or less were
deemed presumptively adequate; and requirements of 10% or more
112
were deemed presumptively excessive.
The foregoing structural interpretation of Storer helps to make
sense of some otherwise perplexing features of Munro v. Socialist Workers Party,143 Norman v. Reed,144 and Burdick v. Takushi,145 the Court's
most recent forays into ballot access.
At issue in Munro was a 1977 enactment of the Washington State
Legislature that made it much more difficult for minor parties to get
on the general election ballot. Prior to 1977, any conventionnominated, minor party candidate could obtain a place on Washington's general election ballot by filing a certificate signed by one hundred registered voters who had participated in the convention and refrained from voting in the primary election. 146 Under the new regime,
all candidates who sought to appear on the general election ballot
had to participate in a blanket primary, and only those who received
at least 1% of the vote were awarded a slot on the general election ballot. 147 Before the change in the law, numerous minor parties qualified
141

Unless, perhaps, the burden was created for patently discriminatory reasons or

is utterly arbitrary. See infra Part II.C.2.
142 Stords chosen proxy is highly imperfect.
For example, it ignores questions
about the timing of the signature requirement. But Storers proxy-based presumption is
not conclusive: a plaintiff might still prevail if she can demonstrate empirically that,
say, a state's 5% signature requirement, in conjunction with other features of the
state's ballot-access regime, makes independent access to the ballot a practical impossibility. Conversely, a state might forestall meaningful judicial scrutiny of, say, a 10%
signature requirement, by demonstrating that independent candidates have, in fact,
qualified frequently under the 10% regime.
143 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
144

502 U.S. 279 (1992).

145 504

U.S. 428 (1992).

Munro, 479 U.S. at 191.
147 Id. at 191-92.
146
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for the ballot in nearly all general elections; afterwards, minor party
ballot appearances became much rarer.148 Relative to pre-19 7 7 ballotaccess rules, the burden of the new law was, as the Ninth Circuit said,
"dramatic."149 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit applied exacting scrutiny and struck down the law.) O
The Supreme Court reversed. Notwithstanding the law's "dra1 1
matic" impact, the Court judged the associated burden "slight." 5
"Comparing the actual experience before and after 1977," wrote the
Court, "tells us nothing about how minor parties would have fared in
those earlier years had Washington conditioned ballot access to the
maximum extent permitted by the Constitution." 152 That may be true,
but the Court's notion of measuring the scrutiny-level-determining
burden of an election law by comparison to the "maximum restriction
that the Constitution permits" is conceptually incoherent under the
rights/justification model of constitutional adjudication. The reason
for measuring burdens is to identify the correct scrutiny level, and the
choice among scrutiny levels has huge consequences for what "the
Constitution permits," so it would be circular to measure burdens by
comparison to the "maximum restriction that the Constitution permits." Indeed, under the rights/justification model, there should be
no such thing as a generic, unvarying "maximum restriction that the
Constitution permits." What ought to be allowed (in any given case)

148

See the Ninth Circuit's explanation in Socialist Workers Party v. Secretary of State:

Prior to 1977, candidates of minor parties qualified for the general election
ballot in contests for statewide office with regularity. At least one minor party
appeared on the general election ballot in every Washington gubernatorial
election from 1896 to 1976 except 1952. Two or more minor party candidates
qualified in all but two of these elections. Forty minor party candidates appeared on the general election ballot for statewide offices in the five general
elections between 1968 and 1976.
The 1977 amendment to Wash.Rev.Code section [sic] 29.18.110 worked a
striking change. According to the affidavit of Washington's Supervisor of
Elections, since 1977 minor parties "have not been successful at qualifying
candidates for the state general election ballot for statewide offices." Although one or more minor parties nominated candidates in each of the four
statewide elections held between 1978 and 1983, none qualified for the general election ballot. In 1984 one of four minor party candidates nominated
qualified for the general election ballot.
765 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1985).
149

Id.

150Id. at 1420-22.
151

Munro, 479 U.S. at 199.

152

Id. at 197.

350

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYL VANIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 156: 313

will depend on a weighing of the burden, the degree to which the
challenged requirements advance substantial
state interests, and the
3
feasibility of less burdensome alternatives. 15
The notion of a "maximum restriction that the Constitution permits" (independent of evidentiary showings by the state, etc.) is more
sensical, however, if one understands the ballot-access jurisprudence
in the structural terms presented above. The maximally restrictive regime conditions third parties' and independents' access to the ballot
on large showings of popular support, without being so demanding
that "reasonably diligent candidates" qualify "only rarely." 154 The
Munro Court was correct-in the sense of being faithful to Storer-to
describe as "slight" the burden of Washington's new ballot-access law,
not because the burden on the plaintiff political party was trivial in
any material sense, but because burdens labeled "slight" receive highly
deferential review under the sliding-scale standard. In other words,
the label was shorthand for saying that rational-basis-like review was in
order. The proper reason for deference, however, was that the 1%
threshold showing of support required by Washington was less than
the 5% deemed presumptively permissible in Storer, and the evidence
in the record did not establish an exclusion of minor party candidates
sufficiently complete to overcome this presumption. 155 The language

153 Of course, there is no way to say what
the "magnitude" of the burden is without
a baseline for comparison. Cf Charles, Democracy and Distortion, supra note 39, at 65355 (arguing that rights claims are predicated on structural baseline assumptions). But
I do not think that the "baseline problem" necessarily poses significant conceptual or
practical difficulties for the traditional rights/justification model of fundamental-rights
adjudication. For example, the courts could allow plaintiffs to measure the burden of
a challenged electoral requirement with reference to the least burdensome alternative
presently in use in another state. (This is essentially the tack that the plaintiffs pursued, unsuccessfully, in ACORN v. Bysiewicz, 413 F. Supp. 2d 119 (2005). See supra text
accompanying notes 19-24.) This approach would seem practicable so long as the alternative that would be "least burdensome" for the plaintiffs would not present greater
burdens (compared to the status quo) for some other class of participants in the political process.
"4 In the interest of precision, though, it would be better to describe this not as
the "maximum restriction that the Constitution permits," but as the "maximum restriction that will receive deferential review." Thanks to Floyd Feeney for suggesting this
refinement.
155 See Munro, 479 U.S. at 196-97 ("Much is
made of the fact that.., since 1977
only 1 out of 12 minor-party candidates has appeared" on the ballot, while prior to
1977, virtually every minor party candidate did. However, "[s]uch historical facts...
prove very little in this case, other than the fact that [the new law] does not provide an
insuperable barrier to minor-party ballot access.").
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of burdens tends to obscure this (witness the Ninth Circuit's decision) 156
A few years after Munro, in Norman v. Reed,157 the Supreme Court
made short work of a new political party's argument that the ballotqualifying show of support (25,000 signatures) it had made in one political subdivision should also qualify it for the ballot in an adjoining
subdivision. (The state required an additional 25,000 signatures from

voters in the adjoining subdivision. 5 s ) The Court, perJustice Souter,
observed that 25,000 signatures represented only 2% of the pool of

prospective petition signers.' 59 Accordingly, the plaintiff's argument
was deemed "foreclose [d]" by precedents upholding 5% requirements.'60 Enough said. The Court did not even bother to remark that
on a sufficient evidentiary record, the presumptively "open" character
of a ballot-access regime with a 2% signature requirement might be
rebutted.
Burdick,16' decided the same year as Norman, involved a challenge
to Hawaii's ban on write-in ballots. The ban was one component of a
larger system of ballot-access laws that advantaged the then-dominant
Democratic Party. 62 The plaintiff's lawyers might have attacked the
ballot-access law directly, but in light of Storer, that route was unpromising (similar attacks had been launched and failed in Hawaii's state
courts). 163 So they went after the write-in ban instead. The Supreme

.6

Socialist Workers Party v. Sec'y of State, 765 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1985).

157502 U.S. 279 (1992).
158Id. at 295.
159

Id.

160

Id.

161

504 U.S. 428 (1992).
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 39, at 670-72 (explaining how the state's ballot-

162

access laws discouraged voters from supporting independent candidates).
163 It perhaps bears noting that one feature of Hawaii's ballot-access
regime was, in
my view, quite vulnerable under Storer. To qualify for the general election ballot, independent candidates had to run in an open primary in which they appeared on a designated "nonpartisan" ballot; only those independents who won at least "10 percent of
the primary vote, or the number of votes that was sufficient to nominate a partisan
candidate, whichever number [was] lower," qualified for the general election. Burdick,
504 U.S. at 436. Recall that in Storer, the Court said that "[i]f the required signatures
approach 10% of the eligible pool of voters," serious judicial scrutiny of the necessity
of the signature requirement would be in order. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 743
(1974); see also supra text accompanying notes 136-141. The 10%-of-the-primary-vote
requirement in Burdick is relevantly analogous to a 10% signature requirement; cf
Munro v. Sociality Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1986) (treating Washington's
1% vote requirement in a blanket primary as equivalent to a signature requirement of
1% of the available pool). Indeed, it might be considerably more "extreme" in prac-
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Court had little patience for this, concluding that because of the
"adequate ballot access afforded under Hawaii's election code," ' 64 the
burden of the write-in ban was necessarily "limited" and "slight.' 6
On this view, writing in a candidate's name is just another form of ballot access, so if the principal route of access comports with the Court's
basic structural demands, any asserted problems with the secondary
routes are not of constitutional concern.
Burdick has been harshly criticized by Samuel Issacharoff and
Richard Pildes, the leading academic proponents of a structural approach to judicial review of election laws.' 66 Issacharoff and Pildes
portray the Court as having glossed the plaintiff's claim in "narrow,
individualistic, nonsystemic" terms.' 67 They take the Court to task for
seeing only an asserted "right to cast a protest vote," rather than a
challenge to the Democratic Party's "partisan lockup" of Hawaiian
elections. ' 6s This criticism goes too far. It was the petitioner who
framed the case in "narrow, individualistic, nonsystemic terms," setting it up as a matter of state infringement on the plaintiff-voter's liberty of conscience and freedom of expression.169 The Court declined
tice, depending on the number of people eligible to vote the nonpartisan ballot.
When the 10% requirement was litigated in state court (pre-Munro), however, the Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the petition/signature analogy and disputed the notion
that Storer established a "numerical test." See Hustace v. Doi, 588 P.2d 915, 924-25
(Haw. 1978).
164 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438. The Burdick Court made
only a cursory examination
of the adequacy of ballot access afforded under Hawaii law. This may have been due
to the fact that the plaintiffs were not challenging the constitutional sufficiency of Hawaii's ballot-access laws, or to the fact that the Hawaii Supreme Court had already
heard and rejected such challenges. See id. at 431-32 (discussing Burdick v. Takushi,
776 P.2d 824, 825 (Haw. 1989)). A third possibility is that the Court was silently redefining minor-party and independent candidates' right of ballot access as a right of access to some ballot, rather than a right of access to the general election ballot. Cf Burdick, 504 U.S. 435-37 (describing the liberal access to primary ballots under Hawaii
law); Munro, 479 U.S. at 189-99 (emphasizing liberality of access to Washington's blanket primary ballot in rejecting a third party's attack on barriers to the general election
ballot).
165 Id. at 438-39; see also id. at 441 ("[W]hen
a State's ballot access laws pass constitutional muster.., a prohibition on write-in voting will be presumptively valid, since
any burden on the fight to vote for the candidate of one's choice will be light . .
166 Issacharoff & Pildes,
supra note 39, at 670-74.
167 Id.

at 672.

Id. at 672-73.
169 Petitioner's Brief, Burdick, 504 U.S. 428 (No. 91-535),
1992 WL 532906 at *1112 (proposing that write-in bans "offend[] three distinct-although, in this case, interrelated-constitutional principles": (a) the citizen's right to "direct his 'portion of
sovereign power' to a candidate of his own choosing"; (b) the citizen's right to "remain
free from being forced to express support for ideological positions or individuals with
168
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this invitation to find an expressive element in the right to vote, explaining:
[T]he function of the election process is "to winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates," not to provide a means of giving vent
to "short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel[s]." Attributing to elections a more generalized expressive function would undermine the ability of States to operate elections fairly and efficiently.,7o

Accordingly, the Court analyzed the write-in ban in terms of structural ballot-access precedents. The Court should not be blamed for
overlooking the putative "partisan lockup." The issue was not fairly
presented in the petitioner's brief, and, as we shall see, there is precedent within the Storer-Burdickjurisprudencefor flipping the presumption of permissibility in cases involving electoral mechanics that were
designed to discriminate against groups of citizens with common political interests. 171
2. Qualitative Cutoffs: On Kusper v. Pontikes and Advance
Enrollment for Voting in Partisan Primaries
Storer set a fixed, numerical cutoff to deal with a problem of degree: signature requirements of less than 5% are presumptively permissible, whereas requirements approaching 10% are presumptively
impermissible. 172 In Rosario v. Rockefeller 73 and Kusper v. Pontikes,7 4 two
cases decided about the same time as Storer, the Court policed a similar problem of degree in a more qualitative fashion, tying the presumptive permissibility of advance-enrollment requirements for participation in primary elections to the interval of time between
elections.
Rosario sustained New York's requirement that primary voters "enroll in the party of [their] choice at least 30 days before the [preceding] general election." 175 New York held its presidential primaries in

which one disagrees"; and (c) the citizen's right to "express dissent" at the ballot box
by conveying the message, "None of the above.").
170Burdick,

504 U.S. at 438 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting

Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974)); see also Karlan, supra note 6, at 1722 (arguing that the Court treated Burdick as a case about the aggregation of votes, rather than
about the individual right to participate in the first instance).
171

See infra Part I.C.

Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 743 (1974).
U.S. 752 (1973).
174 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
17

173 410

175410

U.S. at 754.
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June and nonpresidential primaries in September, so the statute created effective advance-enrollment requirements of eight and eleven
months, respectively. 176 A five-Justice majority of the Court opted for
kid-gloves scrutiny,117 nominally because New York had "merely imposed a time deadline on... enrollment" rather than "absolutely
dis78
enfranchis[ing] the class to which the petitioners belong."
Kusper came out differently. The Illinois Election Code provision
at issue barred anyone from "voting in the primary election of a political party if he has voted in the primary of any other party within the
preceding 23 months." 7 9 The petitioner, who had voted in a Republican primary in February 1971, was therefore unable to participate in
the Democratic primary of March 1972." o As the Court saw it, this was
no "mere[] . .. time limit on enrollment."' 8' Rather, the statute operated to "lock[] a voter into an unwanted party affiliation from one
election to the next": 8 2 "[u]nlike the petitioners in Rosario, whose
disenfranchisement was caused by their own failure to take timely
measures to enroll, there was no action that Mrs. Pontikes could have
taken to make herself eligible to vote in the 1972 Democratic primary."'83 In short, Illinois "absolutely precluded" citizens who had
participated in one primary election from switching parties and voting
in the next.I14 The Illinois enrollment rule therefore received no presumption of constitutionality, and was struck down on the theory that
"less drastic means"-such as those employed in New York-could be
8
used to guard against raiding. 115
The Court's rhetoric notwithstanding, I fail to see any plausible
deontic basis for distinguishing among advance enrollment requirements based on whether the advance period exceeds the interval of
time between primary elections. Every advance enrollment requirement has the effect of absolutely precluding from participation in the
upcoming primary those new, bona fide party adherents whose

176

Id. at 760.

177As the dissent observed, "The Court's formulation... resembles
the traditional

equal protection 'rational basis' test." Id. at 767 (PowellJ., dissenting).
178 Id. at 757.
:' Kusper, 414 U.S. at 52.
80 Id. at
181
182

52-53.

Id. at 60.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

183 Id.

184Id.
1S5Id. at

61.
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change-of-partisan-heart occurred after the enrollment deadline. A
failure to enroll in advance of the deadline is only voluntary for those
citizens who knew, prior to the deadline, that they would want to vote
in the party primary at issue. Earlier advance enrollment deadlines
naturally exclude more bona fide party switchers than later deadlines,
but this is a difference of degree, not of kind-and a difference that
only matters if the right to vote is cashed out in aggregate/structural
rather than individualistic terms. True, if the length of the advanceenrollment period exceeds the interval of time between primaries,
some party switchers may be required to sit out two rounds of primaries. Yet it seems to me that the only difference of degree that is also a
difference in kind in this context is the difference between requiring
the bona fide party switcher to sit out one primary or none, not two
primaries as opposed to one.
None of this goes to say that the Court was wrong to draw the line
where it did in Kusper.'86 The chosen line is much more intelligible,
however, on a structural rather than an individualistic rights/justification account of the Court's role with respect to election law. On the
individualistic account, the threshold questions should be:
(1)
whether the plaintiff has a constitutionally protected interest in voting
in the election at issue; and if so, (2) whether the state has prevented
her from voting in that election, or materially burdened her effort to
vote. The Court has indicated that the right to vote includes the right
to vote in primary elections if primaries are used to winnow the field
for the general election ballot."" So, on the individualistic account,
any citizen who can show that her genuine, subjective change in party
affiliation occurred after the enrollment deadline ought to be able to
march into court and force the state to demonstrate the practical necessity of the deadline.

186 1

am assuming, here, that the Court meant to draw a firm line in Rosario and

Kusper, and that that line continues to have force today. I suppose that a bona fide
party-switcher whose decision to switch parties postdated an enrollment deadline
shorter than the interval of time between primary elections could mount a challenge
to the deadline on the theory that her exclusion was not voluntary. But I doubt her
claim would succeed, given the Court's penchant for bright lines in this area, and
given the ramification of her argument for any enrollment deadline.
187 See, e.g.,
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (applying the "one person,
one vote" principle to a primary election); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 313-20
(1941) (holding that the right to vote for members of Congress includes the right to
vote in primary elections when the primary has been made "an integral part of the
procedure for.., popular choice").
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On the structural account, by contrast, it is of no particular moment that a bona fide member of the relevant electorate was prevented from voting. What matters, at the threshold stage, is whether
there is some basis for thinking that the aggregate constitutional costs
of the challenged law (or the class of laws to which it belongs) substantially exceed the benefits. With respect to lengthy advanceenrollment periods, one might count as constitutional costs the diminished responsiveness of the nomination process to the wishes of
the citizenry (might the party old guard capture the nomination
process by excluding new adherents?), and disaffection or loss of confidence in the political process on the part of citizens who find themselves excluded. Then again, advance enrollment requirements may
have real benefits in terms of discouraging opportunistic raiding.
Over time, raiding could cause political parties to lose their ideological distinctiveness. The cue provided by the party label would become
as a whole might become
less useful for voters, and the electorate
188
more confused and manipulable.
On the structural view, what the Court needed in Rosario and Kusper was an easy way to distinguish extreme and potentially abusive advance-enrollment requirements from ordinary and potentially salutary
requirements. The standard that the Court effectively promulgatedthat such requirements are presumptively permissible if shorter than
the interval of time between primaries, and presumptively impermisBut the Court had to draw a line
sible if longer-is rather arbitrary.
somewhere and the line drawn in Kusper has the advantage of appearing less arbitrary than a fixed numerical cutoff. And, importantly, it
lends itself to consistent application in the lower courts, obviating the
need for messy empirical inquiries into both the number of voters affected by a given enrollment protocol and the practical necessity of
enrollment limitations that affect significant numbers of voters.
Like the 10%-of-the-available-pool cutoff in Storer, the line drawn
in Kusper illustrates the Court's penchant for formalism in setting scrutiny levels. The Court identified an easily verified property that advance-enrollment requirements either have or do not have, and on

188

These are basic tenets of the "responsible party government" school of

thought. On this school and its influence on the Court's political party jurisprudence,
see Lowenstein, supra note 109.
Why
189 Note that it's even more arbitrary from an individual-rights perspective.
should the party switcher who "converts," say, six months before an election, be treated
as having a lesser interest in that election than the party switcher whose conversion experience took place twenty-four months before that election?

2007]

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ELECTORAL MECHANICS

this basis lumped the requirements into "presumptively permissible"
and "presumptively impermissible" categories. What Kuspds rhetoric
hides from sight is that the line the Court drew is more plausibly defended in structural rather than rights-based terms-for Kuspers line
does not assure the bona fide party switcher excluded by an advanceenrollment rule that she will be able to haul the state into court and
make it demonstrate the necessity of her exclusion.
3. Dynamic Cutoffs: On Randall v. Sorrell, Norman v. Reed, and the
Emergence of Cutoffs Tied to the Legal Landscape
The cutoffs drawn in Storer and Kusper seem to rest on little more
than stab-in-the-dark guesses about how best to define constitutional
limits on the law of democracy. In lieu of sheer guesswork, the Justices might have tried to set limits based on features of the larger legal
landscape. Such limits could evolve dynamically, as the states update
their election laws over time. There are some nascent indications that
the Burdick jurisprudence may evolve in this direction.
a. Randall: The NationalLandscape
Randall v. Sorrell,19 issued in 2006, was the Court's first decision to
strike down a campaign contribution limit as unconstitutionally low.
Although the Court has never treated campaign finance law, as such,
as part of the ordinary run of electoral mechanics (and hence subject
to the sliding-scale or no-litmus-test scrutiny of Storer/Burdick), it is
nonetheless appropriate to view the Court's recent contribution limit
jurisprudence as substantially informed by-and ready to feed back
into-the electoral mechanics case law.
The pivotal case was Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,19' in
which the Court per Justice Souter finally interred the notion that
contribution limits were subject to strict scrutiny.'9 2 Shrink prescribed
a species of sliding scale scrutiny, under which "[t] he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility

190

126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).

191 528

U.S. 377 (2000).

See id. at 386-88 (examining Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and noting
that
"[w]hile we did not then say in so many words that different standards might govern
expenditure and contribution limit affecting associational rights, we have since then
said so explicitly").
192
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of the justification raised."' 93 This is nominally different from Burdick's version of sliding scale scrutiny, under which the level of scrutiny is supposed to vary with the burden created by the law rather than
with the plausibility of the state's justifications for it. But if the overarching argument of this Article is correct, the difference is only
nominal. The Storer-Burdick jurisprudence is not burden-centric in
any meaningful sense; rather, it simply establishes a baseline presumption of permissibility for a large class of constitutionally significant
laws, and a rather ad hoc collection of moves for flipping this presumption in cases where certain readily verified indicators suggest that
194
something is seriously amiss.
Justice Breyer, concurring in Shrink, made the analytic connection
to Storer more explicit. Breyer began by postulating that when the
state regulates contribution limits, "constitutionally
protected interests
S
195
lie on both sides of the legal equation."
In light of this, "a presumption against constitutionality is out of place."' 96 What the Court must
do instead is "balance[] interests," judging "whether the statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of proportion to the statute's salutary effects upon the others."'' 97 And in doing this balancing,
courts generally should defer to "empirical legislative judgments," be-

199 Id.
194

at 391.

Looking to the novelty or plausibility of the justifications asserted on behalf of

a challenged law might serve as one more means of flipping the presumption of constitutionality. If a law is so peculiar that the state's lawyers cannot dredge up a traditional
justification for it, something may well be awry.
195 Id. at 400 (Breyer, J.). Breyer explained the problem as follows:
On the one hand, a decision to contribute money to a campaign is a matter
of First Amendment concern... because [money] enables speech.... Both political association and political communication are at stake.
On the other hand, restrictions upon the amount any one individual can
contribute to a particular candidate seek to protect the integrity of the electoral process-the means through which a free society democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action.... Moreover, by limiting the size of the largest contributions, such restrictions aim to democratize
the influence that money itself may bring to bear upon the electoral process.
Cf Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (in the context of apportionment, the Constitution "demands" that each citizen have "an equally effective
voice"). In doing so, they seek to build public confidence in that process and
broaden the base of a candidate's meaningful financial support, encouraging
the public participation and open discussion that the First Amendment itself
presupposes.
Id. at 400-01 (some citations omitted).
196Id.
197

at 401.

Id. at 402.
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cause of the legislature's "significantly greater institutional expertise. "'9s This approach, said Breyer-citing Storer and its progeny-is
precisely what is found in the Court's jurisprudence concerning "the
integrity of the electoral process. " '
In Randall, deference to the legislature's empirical judgments
reached a limit; Shrink's presumption of constitutionality for contribution limits was neutralized. Justice Breyer, writing the plurality opinion for himself, Justice Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts, began by reiterating Shrink's teaching that judicial deference to legislative
judgments concerning the level of contribution limits is ordinarily
called for.200 But the courts "must recognize the existence of some
lower bound," because "contribution limits that are too low can...
harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting
effective campaigns against incumbent office-holders, thereby reducing democratic accountability." 20 1 Instead of prescribing a presumptive numerical floor on contribution limits, however, Breyer wrote that
courts should look for "strong indication in a particular case, i.e.,
'danger signs,' that ... risks [to the democratic process] exist (both
present in kind and likely serious in degree). ",0 Only then should
courts "review the record independently and carefully with an eye toward assessing the . . . proportionality of the restrictions. 2 °3
On the facts of Randall, Breyer found such "danger signs" in the
disparity between Vermont's contribution limits and "the contribution
limits upheld by the Court in the past, and with those in force in other
States." 2 4 "Considered as a whole," he wrote, "Vermont's contribution
limits are the lowest in the Nation."20 5 This warranted heightened scru198Id. (noting, however, that deference would not be in order insofar as it
"risk[ed] such constitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents to insulate themselves
from effective electoral challenge").
199 Id. at 403-04. Some years ago, Alan Brownstein anticipated Breyer's argument

in Shrink with a very similar "Constitution on both sides" account of the Supreme
Court's ballot-access jurisprudence. See Brownstein, supra note 53, at 914-19.
200 See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2492 (2006) ("We cannot
determine with
any degree of exactitude the precise restriction necessary to carry out the statute's legitimate objectives. In practice, the legislature is better equipped to make such empirical judgments, as legislators have 'particular expertise' in matters related to the
costs and nature of running for office." (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003))).
201 Id.
202

Id.

203

Id.

204

Id.

205

Id. at 2493 (emphasis added).
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tiny, and, after perusing the record, Breyer concluded that while the
ultimate impact of Vermont's low limits remained uncertain, the risks
to political accountability were too great tojustify the restrictions. 206
Notice the many commonalities between the Randall plurality's
approach to contribution limits and Storers take on ballot access.
Each opinion deals with a domain in which implementation of the
Constitution's purposes depends on supportive legislation; there is no
satisfactory libertarian alternative.0 7 Each opinion recognizes, however, that legislation enacted in the name of high purposes may in fact
create structural harms: a ballot-access regime in which third-party or
independent candidates qualify "only rarely," depriving the electorate
of an adequate range of choices, or a system of contribution limits
that privileges incumbents and mutes challengers, undermining democratic accountability. Each opinion treats the potential for these
structural harms as the basis for judicial intervention."' Yet each
206See id. at 2494-2500 (noting, first, that "the record suggests
though it does not
conclusively prove, that Act 64's contribution limits will significantly restrict the
amount of funding available for challengers to run competitive campaigns"; second,
that "Act 64's insistence that political parties abide by exactly the same low contribution
limits that apply to other contributors threatens harm to a particularly important political right, the right to associate in a political party"; third, that the Act's failure to
exclude from the definition of contribution "the expenses [that] volunteers incur,
such as travel expenses, in the course of campaign activities" "aggravates the problem";
fourth, that "Act 64's contribution limits are not adjusted for inflation"; fifth, that
there were no exceptional circumstances in the record that might provide "special justification" for Act 64's limits). It is worth observing that even in the application of
heightened scrutiny, Justice Breyer did not rely in the main on evidence concerning
the asserted negative impact of Act 64's limits. Rather, he inferred that such "risks"
were significant based on the law's low limits (relative to other states) and suspect formal properties (lack of indexing, lack of preferential treatment for political party contributions, lack of exemptions for volunteer expenses).
207To be sure, this premise, while true for Breyer, is contested
by others who believe that a free flow of money to political campaigns is not only consistent with the
Constitution's purposes, but required by it. See, e.g.,
BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE
SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 109-20 (2001) (arguing that campaign finance regulation violates the First Amendment right to free speech).
208Rick Hasen argues that the Randall plurality's putative concern
with structural
harm to political accountability is disingenuous. See Hasen, The Newer Incoherence, supra
note 39, at 873-77. I am not so sure. A big part of Hasen's argument is that the Court
has declined other invitations to regulate the political process in the interest of more
competitive elections, as exemplified by the recent partisan gerrymandering cases
(Vieth v. Jubelirer,541 U.S. 267 (2004), and League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Perry (LULAC), 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006)), and the holding in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area
New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997). See Hasen, The Newer Incoherence, supra note 39, at 87072. However, the Court's reluctance to intervene in the partisan gerrymandering cases
is plausibly due to uncertainty about how to intervene productively, not to a lack of concern about representative and accountable legislatures. See infra note 277 and accom-
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opinion also recognizes, tacitly, that a jurisprudence that required
proof of the feared structural harm may create more difficulties than
it solves. (Under such a regime, for example, unconstitutional laws
might have to be left in place for many years before sufficient evidence of the structural injury has accumulated. And courts would be
required to make the sort of empirical judgments that, on Breyer's legal process view, are best left to legislatures.) 2 0 Accordingly, each
opinion elaborates a doctrine under which the presumption of constitutionality may be flipped on a fairly mechanical showing: in Storer,
that the signature requirement approaches 10% of the available pool;
in Randall, that the contribution limit is an outlier relative to the limits
employed in other states.
It is because of these commonalities, and not just the Randall plurality's citing of Storer, that I expect the danger-signs/outlier-amongthe-states methodology to be deployed (by some Justices at least) in
future electoral mechanics cases.
b. Norman: State/LocalDisparities
Norman v. Reed2 10 involved a challenge to various Illinois requirements for third-party ballot access in local elections. As noted above,
the Court quickly dismissed the petitioner's argument that gathering a
sufficient number of signatures to qualify for the ballot in an urban
district should also ballot-qualify the petitioner in the adjoining suburban district.21' The number of signatures required to field candi-

panying text. And whereas Hasen sees "an individual rights approach" in Kennedy's
statement in LULAC that the litigant who would challenge a partisan gerrymander
must "show a burden, as measured by a reliable standard, on the complainants' representational rights," Hasen, The Newer Incoherence, supra note 39, at 872-73 (quoting LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2610), I see only a familiar insistence that the party bringing the
claim have standing, and that the underlying substance of the claim be amenable to
resolution with fairly clear-cut doctrine. As for Timmons, its "structural" merits are disputed. Compare Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 39, at 683-87 (criticizing the decision),
with Schleicher, supra note 110, at 197-202 (defending Timmons as an appropriate, procompetition judicial response to conditions of natural duopoly created by singlemember districts and first-past-the-post elections).
Note that Breyer's application of heightened scrutiny in Randall turned in large
part on qualitative factors, rather than on the actual impact of the contribution limits
on political competition. See supra note 206. Thus, I am unconvinced by Rick Hasen's
prediction that heightened scrutiny under Randall necessarily will "devolve into a 'battle of the experts' over how [the challenged] limits would affect political competition."
Hasen, The Newer Incoherence, supra note 39, at 884.
210 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
211 See supra notes 157-160 and accompanying
text.
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dates in the suburban district was well below Storer's 5% threshold,
and thus presumptively permissible.2 12
The petitioner prevailed, however, on her challenge to a rule that
tied the fate of a new political party's effort to qualify a candidate for
any elective office within a districted local government to the party's
success or failure in gathering signatures on behalf of candidates for
213
other offices.
To field a candidate in any one district, the political
14
party had to gather 25,000 signatures from voters in that district.2
But if the party failed to gather 25,000 signatures in each district
where it sought to field candidates, all of the party's candidates for the
local government in question were disqualified. 1 5 This rule increased
the effective signature requirement for qualifying candidates within a
single district to "some multiple of" 25,000. Yet only 25,000 signatures
were required to ballot qualify a slate of candidates for statewide
elected office. 216 As the Court saw it, once the state had concluded
that 25,000 signatures represented a sufficient "modicum of support"
to warrant a place on statewide ballots,
the state could not insist on a
217
higher number for local offices.
The Court based this holding on
218
Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, a 1979 decision
striking down an earlier law that had the effect of increasing the signature requirement for certain municipal offices beyond the 25,000 required of statewide candidates.
Socialist Workers Party is an aberrational case. The opinion, written
by Justice Marshall, applies Dunn-style strict scrutiny on the premise
that all ballot-access "restrictions" and "classification [s]" are unconstitutional unless "necessary to serve a compelling interest., 2 9 That
premise is in considerable tension with Storer (where Marshall dissented), and untenable after Munro, Burdick, and Clingman.
Read narrowly, Norman's holding on the all-offices-or-none rule
merely gives stare decisis effect to an otherwise outmoded decision,
and its principle ought not be extended to other contexts. Read more

212 See Norman, 502
213

Id. at 291-94.

U.S. at 295.

Id. at 282.
Id. at 286.
216 Id. at 293.

214

215

217

Id. at 293-94 ("[T]he State's requirements for access to the statewide ballot be-

come criteria in the first instance for judging whether rules of access to local ballots
are narrow enough to pass constitutional muster.").
218

219

440 U.S. 173 (1979).
Id. at 184.

2007]

JUDICIAL REVIEW OFELECTORAL MECHANICS

363

broadly, Norman might be reinterpreted as a nascent effort at the
Breyerian danger-signs approach.2
On this view, if the state requires
more signatures to qualify for a local office than for a statewide office,
something is probably awry with the cost-benefit balance, and the
courts should take a closer look at the substantive reasonableness of
the local requirement-even if the plaintiffs are unable to show that
third parties and independents have been required
to gather signa221
tures from close to 10% of the available pool.
C. LegislativePurpose
When the Court has reversed the presumption of constitutionality
concerning•• electoral
mechanics regulations,
222
.
223 it has usually employed

severe-in-kind
or structural presumption
strategies. Another option, invited but not yet fully embraced in the Burdick era, is to rely on
legislative intent or purpose. 224 The electoral mechanics jurispru220See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2492 (2006) (suggesting that
where there

are strong indications of "danger signs" of electoral unfairness, courts must assess the
statute's tailoring).
221 For a recent example of a voter participation case
in which state/local disparities might have been used in setting scrutiny levels, but were not, see ACLU of New
Mexico v. Santillanes, No. Civ. 05-1136, 2007 WL 782167, at *36-37 (D.N.M. Feb. 12,
2007) (enjoining an Albuquerque photo ID requirement for voting, which was substantially more restrictive than the ID requirements established under state law).
222See, e.g.,
Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
223See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
224The courts and the law review literature sometimes distinguish between
"legislative intent," corresponding to the actual, subjective intentions of the lawmakers who
enacted a bill, and "legislative purpose," an objective standard corresponding to what a
reasonable observer would assume to be the intended effect of the bill. Given the epistemic difficulties and intrusive discovery that ascertaining legislative intent would entail (even assuming that the concept has meaning in the context of a multimember
body), both courts and commentators increasingly favor purpose-based rather than
intent-based inquiries. For a recent, prominent example, see McCrealy County v. ACLU
of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 859-74 (2005) (using purpose analysis to resolve an Establishment Clause challenge). See also Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 730-31
(1998) (defending doctrinal approaches that turn on social meaning of legislative actions); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 793-97
(2001) (distinguishing purpose and intent, and defending judicial reliance on purpose); Gil Seinfeld, The Possibility of Pretext Analysis in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1301-03 (2003) (explaining that "the process ofjudicial review stands on considerably firmer ground" when courts in pretext cases search for objective purpose rather than subjective legislative intent). In this Article, however, I will
use "intent" and "purpose" interchangeably; the role of intent (or purpose) in electoral mechanics adjudication is not yet well enough developed to necessitate distinguishing between the two concepts.
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dence has openings for three types of purpose-based arguments. First,
election laws may be presumed to have their intended effects, at least
absent compelling evidence to the contrary. If the effect intended is
"severe," no more need be shown. Second, burdens conceded not to
be severe might nonetheless be characterized as presumptively impermissible, or at least not presumptively permissible, if created for
illegitimate reasons. Third, and going further, it may be argued that
the very reason that burdens of great magnitude are supposed to trigger heightened scrutiny is that the size of the burden bespeaks exclusionary or anticompetitive intent. If so, any equally probative indicator of bad intent should also obligate the state to demonstrate the
substantive reasonableness of the law or otherwise to rebut the presumption of illicit purpose.
On the other hand, in some election law contexts, the Supreme
Court has pointedly held that illicit purposes do not, without more,
give rise to a presumption of unconstitutionality. How the lower
courts are supposed to deal with bad intent in electoral mechanics
cases is not altogether clear. It would be healthy for the courts to begin to wrestle with it.
1. Inferring Effects from Purpose
225

Calfornia Democratic Party v. Jones invalidated California's blanket primary system. Under the stricken regime, all California voters
participated in a single primary election in which they could vote for
candidates of any party. 226 The top vote-getter within each pool of ma227
jor-party candidates advanced to the general election.
After a bench trial full of expert testimony, the district court carefully sifted through the evidence of crossover voting and weighed the
probability that the blanket primary would result in the nomination of
partisan candidates disliked by their party's members or committed to
political positions disfavored by the party."' The court ultimately concluded that the burden on the party's associational rights was not severe, and that it was justified by state interests in enhancing "the democratic nature of the election process and the representativeness of

530 U.S. 567 (2000).
Id. at 569-70.
227 Id.
228Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1297-1300 (C.D.
Cal. 1997)
rev'd, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
225

226
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elected officials. '' 229 The Supreme Court reversed. Working within
the Burdick framework, the Court, per Justice Scalia, judged the blanket primary severely burdensome.23 °
On one reading, the gist of Jones is that the "forced association" of
a political party with primary voters who decline to enroll in the party
constitutes a severe-in-kind burden.2 3' Cutting against this interpretation is the fact that Justice Scalia devoted two pages of his opinion to
discussing empirical studies of crossover voting." 23 2 Such evidence is
immaterial on the severe-in-kind theory of burden. So perhaps Jones
bespeaks a new readiness on the part of the Court to link scrutiny levels to empirical evidence of impact. In my view, however, the critical
after Scalia describes (or, as the dissent would
line in Jones comes
•
/ ,1 right
233\
have it, misdescribes ) the evidence. He continues: "It is unnecessary
to cumulate evidence of this phenomenon [of party nominees changing their positions in order to survive the blanket primary], since, after all, the whole purpose of Proposition 198 was to favor nominees
with 'moderate' positions., 234 The import of this line is unmistakable.
The admitted purpose of the law made it unnecessary for the plaintiffs
to prove, as a precondition for strict scrutiny, that the law had the intended (severe) effect of causing party nominees to adopt positions
substantially at odds with the views of the party membership. The
235
Court presumed an efficacious state.

Id. at 1300-01.
Jones, 530 U.S. at 572-82.
231 See id. at 577 ("Proposition 198 forces political parties to associate with-to
229
230

have their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by-those who, at best,
have refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a
rival. In this respect, it is qualitatively different from a closed primary." (emphasis
added)); id. at 581 ("There is simply no substitute for a party's selecting its own candidates.").
232

Id. at 578-79.

See id. at 599-600 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 580 (majority opinion) (first emphasis added).
the problem with Proposition 198 as follows:
233
234

The Court summarized

Proposition 198 forces petitioners to adulterate their candidate-selection
process-the basic function of a political party-by opening it up to persons
wholly unaffiliated with the party. Such forced association has the likely outcome-indeed, in this case the intended outcome-of changing the parties'
message. We can think of no heavier burden on a political party's associational freedom.
Id. at 581-82 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
235 Cf Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit Legislative Motive in the Municipal
Land Use Regulation Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 38 (1988) (suggesting a place for legislative motive in
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2. Heightened Scrutiny for Discriminatory but Nonsevere Burdens?
Recall that Burdick counterposed "severe restrictions" (presumptively impermissible) against "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" (presumptively permissible). How should courts approach the
category in the middle-the discriminatory restriction that is conceded not to be severely burdensome? There are really two questions
here: (1) What types of discriminatory purposes are constitutionally
troublesome in the electoral mechanics context? (2) Does the existence of such a purpose, without more, suffice to neutralize or reverse
the presumption of permissibility? The Supreme Court has had more
to say about the first question than the second.
The Court has been very clear that the word "discriminatory" encompasses more than the traditional suspect classes when it comes to
voting. The foundational case is Carrington v. Rash.136 At issue was a
provision in the Texas constitution that prohibited "[a] ny member of
the Armed Forces of the United States who moves his home to Texas
during the course of his military duty from ever voting in any election
in [Texas] so long as he or she is a member of the Armed Forces."237
The state defended this franchise denial as, inter alia, an appropriate
measure to "immuniz[e] its elections from the concentrated balloting
of military personnel, whose collective voice may overwhelm a small
local civilian community., 238 As described by the Court:
A base commander, Texas suggests, who opposes local police administra-

tion or teaching policies in local schools, might influence his men to
vote in conformity with his predilections. Local bond issues may fail,
and property taxes stagnate at low levels because military personnel are
239
unwilling to invest in the future of the area.

The Supreme Court would have none of this:
"Fencing out" from the franchise a sector of the population because of the
way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible. The exercise of rights
so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions cannot constitu-

the application of balancing tests to rights infringement claims, on the theory that "the
legislature's goals are [commonly] a reliable indicator of a statute's effect").
236 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
For a nice treatment of the case, see Alec C. Ewald, An
"Agendafor Demolition": The Fallacy and the Dangerof the "Subversive Voting" Argument for
Felony Disenfranchisement,36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 109, 131-33 (2004).
231 Carrington, 380 U.S. at 89 (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks
omitted).
238 Id. at
93.
239 Id. at 94.
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tionally be obliterated because of a fear of the political views of a particular group of bona fide residents. 240

Also instructive is Gordon v. Lance,241 which sustained a supermajority voting rule for bond referendum elections. The plaintiffs, proponents of the bond issue, argued that the supermajority requirement
impermissibly weighted their votes less than the votes of bond opponents. The Court disagreed, stating that the law did not discriminate
on the basis of "some extraneous condition, such as race [as in Gomil242224
lion ]; wealth [as in Harper243; tax status [as in Kramer 244]; or military
status [as in Carrington245] .,246 "[W] e can discern no independently identifiable group or category," the Court continued,
"that favors bonded in247
financing.,
of
forms
other
over
debtedness
An even broader understanding of what it means for election laws
to discriminate illicitly can be seen in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton24 and Cook v. Gralike.249 The technical question in these cases concerned the outer limits on "Manner" regulations under the Elections
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 25 not what types of electoral regulations merit a presumption of constitutionality under Storer and its
progeny. But both cases draw from and shed light upon the electoral
mechanics jurisprudence. In U.S. Term Limits, the Court nullified an
Arkansas law that "prohibit[ed] the name of an otherwise-eligible
candidate.., from appearing on the general election ballot if that
candidate has already served three terms in the House of Representatives or two terms in the Senate.', 25 1 The state characterized this ballotaccess regulation as a "Manner" regulation, but the Court disagreed,
calling it an impermissible attempt to "favor or disfavor a class of can-

240

Id. at 94 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

241

403 U.S. 1 (1971).

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
243 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966).
244 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S.
621 (1969).
245 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
246Gordon, 403 U.S. at
5.
247 Id. (emphasis added).
242

248
249
250

514 U.S.779 (1995).
531 U.S. 510 (2001).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.I ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec-

tions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing Senators.").
U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 783.
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didates."2 2 The Court drew a contrast with the laws upheld in the
Storer line of cases, which were said to have "regulated election procedures" and not to have "even arguably impose[d] any substantive qualification rendering a class of potential candidates ineligible for ballot
position. '
At issue in Gralike was a Missouri constitutional amendment that
"prescribe[d] that the statement, 'DISREGARDED VOTERS' INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS,' be printed on all primary and general ballots adjacent to the name of a Senator or Representative who
fails to take any one of eight legislative acts in support of the proposed
[Congressional Term Limits Amendment] .'' 4 The Court again rejected the state's effort to shoehorn its requirement into the category of
"Manner" regulations. Rather than being an ordinary "procedural
regulation" of elections, this ballot notation law was "plainly designed to
favor candidates who are willing to support the particular form of a
term limits amendment set forth in its text and to disfavor those who
either oppose term limits entirely or would prefer a different proposal." 255 That made it quite unlike the "generally applicable and evenhanded [ballot-access] restrictions" upheld in Storerand its progeny. 256
U.S. Term Limits and Gralike carry the idea of discrimination well
beyond the intentional disadvantaging of a group of citizens defined
by common interests or traditional political ideologies. The Court did
not find, for example, that the term-limit measures were intended to
disadvantage liberals or conservatives, the rich or the poor, soldiers or
peaceniks, environmentalists or industrialists, or what have you. A
state purpose to disadvantage a class of candidates defined only by

254

Id. at 833-34.
at 835.
531 U.S. at 514.

255

Id. at 523-24.

252

253 Id.

Though the opinion is not altogether clear on this, it appears

that part of the Court's objection to the ballot notation law was that the state was attempting to improperly elevate the salience of a single issue (term limits), in addition to
"taking sides" on that issue. See id. at 525 ("'[B]y directing the citizen's attention to the
single consideration' of the candidates' fidelity to term limits, the labels imply that the
issue 'is an important-perhaps paramount---consideration in the citizen's choice,
which may decisively influence the citizen to cast his ballot ... ' (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 299,402 (1964))).
25 Id. at 524 (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson
v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 788 n.9 (1983)); see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 212-13 (1992) (KennedyJ., concurring) (arguing that polling-area speech restrictions are constitutionally
permissible if enacted for the narrow purpose of protecting the integrity of the ballot
against fraudsters, and not with the aim of limiting political speech for other reasons).
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their long incumbency apparently was enough to classify these laws as
257
discriminatory.
Although the Court has defined discrimination broadly for purposes of voting and associational rights, it remains uncertain whether
discriminatory intent, without more, is enough to negate the presumption of permissibility for electoral mechanics..258 An affirmative
argument may be constructed, however, using a few key data points.
First, the Court has sometimes grounded the right to vote in worries
about legitimacy and public confidence in government. 259 If the right
to vote was constitutionalized so that the Court may steer the ship of
state, as it were, in a manner that enables all citizens (or the largest
possible number of citizens) to feel secure in their berth, then the policing of election laws transparently designed to minimize the political
strength of factions not then in power should be a matter of first importance. The other data points come from Storer and its companion
case, American Party of Texas v. White,' 6° both of which suggest that certain discriminatory restrictions may be struck down even if the burden
is not large or the law otherwise passes muster under the applicable
structural presumption (at least in cases where the restriction is also
hard to defend on the merits).
The ballot-access law at issue in Storerhad been interpreted to disqualify anyone who voted in the primary election from signing an independent candidate's petition, "whether or not he confined his
[primary] vote to nonpartisan offices and propositions., 26' The Supreme Court responded that while it had "no doubt about the validity
of disqualifying [from signing petitions] ... all those registered voters
who voted a partisanballot in the primary[,] .... it would be difficult

257 See Gralike, 531 U.S. at 525; U.S. Term Limits, 514
U.S. at 836. This idea is elaborated by judge Fletcher in her dissent in Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 870-72 (9th Cir.
1997) (en banc). As she reads U.S. Term Limits and Gralike, any state effort to allocate
ballot access on grounds other than popular support within the electorate is impermissibly discriminatory.
258 Similarly, a severe-in-kind burden triggers strict scrutiny, even if
its effects are

trivial.

259 See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621,
626 (1969) ("[S]tatutes
distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our representative society. Any
unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or in
the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative government."); cf Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2006) (per curiam) ("Confidence in
the integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our participa-

tory democracy.").
260

415 U.S. 767 (1974).

261

Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 741 (1974).
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to ascertain any rational ground, let alone a compelling interest, for
disqualifying nonpartisanvoters at the primary ....
The disqualification of nonpartisan primary voters261 from the signature gathering process, like the disqualification of partisan primary
voters, constricts the "available pool" of potential petition signers. Although the Court was not entirely clear about this, it appeared willing
to invalidate the disqualification of nonpartisan primary voters without reference to the relevant structural presumption (i.e., irrespective
of whether the effective signature-gathering requirement approached
10% of the available pool). 21 4 Even if the ballot-access code proved
presumptively constitutional by dint of a numerically reasonable signature threshold, that would not altogether excuse from judicial scrutiny the other classifications in the law.
Storer's treatment of the disqualification of nonpartisan primary
voters might be seen as an application of "rational basis plus" review,
which is arguably the default standard of review for nonsevere burdens. 265 Alternatively, one might hypothesize that the Court thought
the disqualification rule so pointlessly overbroad as to bespeak a discriminatory motive.
American Party held unconstitutional Texas's practice of printing
the names of ballot-qualified minor parties on in-person but not absentee ballots. Although the numerical signature requirement for
minor-party ballot access was presumptively permissible, this did not
excuse the disparate design of in-person and absentee ballots, which
the Court called "obviously discriminatory.",2 6 Did this discrimination
substantially hinder citizens from associating into minor parties for
political change? One might think not, given the in-person voting option. And certainly there was no intimation from the Court that a requirement of voting in-person (as opposed to absentee) would represent a "substantial" or "severe" burden on voting rights. Rather, what
seems to have bothered the Court was the sheer hostility to minor parties reflected in the ballot-design disparity, as well as the pointlessness
267
of that disparity.

262

Id. at 740-41 (emphasis added).

263 That is, persons who "confined [their] vote [during the primary
election] to

nonpartisan offices and propositions." Id. at 741.
2- See supra text accompanying note 141.
265 See supra note
66.
26 Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 795 (1974).
267 I acknowledge that American Party's holding on the ballot-design disparity, like
Storer's treatment of the disqualification of nonpartisan primary voters from signing
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Whatever the merits of heightened scrutiny for discriminatory but
nonsevere burdens, the litigant who would argue this position does
have precedential hurdles to overcome. In some domains of election
law, the Court has tolerated raw partisan purposes so long as the challenged law is not shown to have extremely grave effects. Under Davis
v. Bandemer, for example, districting arrangements designed to minimize legislative representation for members of the political party not
then in power were actionable only if they would have the effect of
"substantially disadvantag[ing]" those voters over the course of several
elections. 268 Although a fractured Court gave up on Bandeme's standard in Vieth v. Jubelirer,269 all of the Justices in Vieth appeared to accept
that some partisanship in redistricting was acceptable. The constitutional question involved line drawing between "some" and "too
much. 27 °
It bears emphasis too that in U.S. Term Limits Inc. v. Thorton,271 the
Court held that the challenged ballot-access restriction was unconstitutional because it had the "sole purpose" and the "likely effect" of
272
evading the limitations found in the Qualifications Clause.
The state's disallowance of ballot access for a disfavored class of candidates
had made it "significantly more difficult for the barred candidate [s] to
win." 273 "Effects" rhetoric was not so prominent in Gralike, but the
Court did say that the challenged ballot labels created "substantial political risk" for disfavored candidates, "handicap[ping them] 'at the
most crucial
stage in the election process-the instant before the vote
4
is cast.

2

1

independents' petitions, could also be viewed as an application of rational basis-plus
review of the substantive reasonableness of the classification. See id. ("The State offered no justification for the difference in treatment in the District Court, did not brief
the issue here, and had little to say in oral argument to justify the discrimination.").
2M 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
269

541 U.S. 267 (2004).

270

See id. at 293 ("[Ain excessive injection of politics [into redistricting] is unlaw-

ful.").
271

514 U.S. 779, 876 (1995).

272

Id. at 836 ("[W]e hold that a state amendment is unconstitutional when it has

the likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates and has the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly.").
273Id. at 831 (emphasis added).
274 Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 525 (2001) (misquoting
Anderson v. Martin, 375
U.S. 399, 402 (1964)).
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Then again, proponents of a pure purpose test for heightened
scrutiny might point to the Jones maxim that election laws may be presumed to have their clearly intended effects.2 'T It would be peculiar
for lawmakers with a partisan-exclusionary purpose to seek anything
less than the maximal exclusion achievable with the tools at hand. So
even if "intent plus big effect" is the gold standard for presumptively
impermissible electoral mechanics, intent (or "predominant intent")
alone may warrant heightened scrutiny when one takes into account
the epistemic and administrative limitations of the judiciary.
Far from being the paradigm case, then, partisan vote dilution
through redistricting may be distinguished as an exception to the
rule, on the theory that the courts had to demand more than a "purpose to dilute" in this context-either because of a Frankfurterian
worry about excessive judicial involvement in a domain of incessant
partisan conflict, 21 6 or because
of judicial anxiety about proportional
277
representation as a remedy.

275
276

See supra Part 11.
C. 1.
Because the Court's malapportionment jurisprudence requires that legislative

districts be withdrawn following each census, redistricting (and redistricting litigation)
presents "incessant" partisan conflict to a degree not found elsewhere in election law.
277 Cf Charles, Democracy and Distortion, supra note
39, at 641-42 (arguing that the
extreme effects test in Bandemer was motivated by concerns about proportional representation and "perpetual litigation of districting plans"); Pildes, supra note 108, at 7678 (suggesting that "[w] hen manageable judicial remedies are readily at hand," courts
are more willing to intervene in political process cases on the basis of exclusionary intent).
On more purely normative grounds, one might also argue that the Constitution
should be read to bar discriminatory intent for purposes of voter participation claims
(recall the Carrington principle), even if not for claims relating to the aggregation of
votes into representation, or the autonomy of political parties. As Richard Pildes has
remarked, "viewpoint discrimination is inevitable in the design of democratic institutions: substantive judgments about the desirable forms of elections and governance
must be made." Pildes, supra note 108, at 108. See also Samuel Issacharoff, FragileDemocracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405 (2007) (providing a comparative perspective on the
regulation through election law of antidemocratic political parties). Pildes's point is
certainly right with respect to many questions about, for example, the translation of
votes into seats, and the balance among responsive, reflective, and technocratic institutions of governance. But it is not implausible to think that no viewpoint discrimination
whatsoever should be tolerated with respect to the basic matter of the citizen's right to
cast and record a vote.
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3. What Is the Cart and What Is the Horse? Or, Are "Severe
Burdens" Merely Indicia of Bad Intent?
If, as I have suggested, the whole point of the Burdick threshold
inquiry is to sort challenged laws into the twin categories of "presumptively constitutional" and "presumptively unconstitutional," then illicit
intent, where ascertainable, might well be a superior dimension for
Concurring in the recent case of Clingman v.
sorting than burden.
279
Beaver, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, seemed to recognize as much. Indeed, she went so far as to hint that the very purpose of Burdick's nominal inquiry into burdens is to get at the likelihood that the challenged law was enacted for "exclusionary or
anticompetitive" reasons (in which case, a presumption of constitutionality would be out of line):
Where the State imposes only reasonable and genuinely neutral restrictions ... , there is no threat to the integrity of the electoral process and
no apparent reason for judicial intervention. As such restrictions become more severe, however, and particularly where they have discriminatory effects, there is increasing cause for concern that those in power
may be using electoral rules to erect barriers to electoral competition.
In such cases, applying heightened scrutiny helps to ensure that such
limitations are trulyjustified and that the State's asserted interests are not
merely a pretext for exclusionay or anticompetitiverestrictions.

278A full examination of why intent criteria are plausibly superior lies beyond
the

scope of this Article. Suffice it to say, for now, that reliance on intent (1) would be
conceptually better suited to screening for unjustified laws-if justification is understood in cost-benefit terms ("burden" is a cost-side measure, insensitive to benefits);
(2) would have certain advantages of familiarity (courts look at intent all the time, in
many contexts, but they are rarely asked to predict the consequences of alternative
electoral arrangements); (3) could save the courts from getting mired in normative
difficulties about burdens and baselines; and, related to this, (4) could simplify the
problem of choosing a "frame" through which to assess the consequences of challenged state practices. Cf Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in ConstitutionalLaw,
111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1371-75 (2002) (arguing that constitutional adjudication turns on
unspoken and often arbitrary premises about which portions of the ongoing relationship between government and citizen are properly at issue in the case).
2 79

544 U.S. 581 (2005).

280

Id. at 603 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

Cf Evans v. Corn-

man, 398 U.S. 419, 422-23 (1970) ("The sole interest.., asserted by appellants to justify the limitation on the vote in the present case is essentially to insure that only those
citizens who are primarily or substantially interested in or affected by electoral decisions have a voice in making them .... However, it is clear that such a claim cannot
lightly be accepted .... All too often, lack of a 'substantial interest' might mean no
more than a different interest, and '"[f]encing out" from the franchise a sector of the
population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.'" (quoting Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965))).
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A heavy burden, one might say, is a "danger sign" that the chal281
lenged law was enacted for exclusionary or anticompetitive reasons,
which in turn should be reason enough to flip the presumption of
282
permissibility.
If the burden-as-danger-sign theory is correct, it follows that the
presence of other strong indicators of exclusionary or anticompetitive
intent should be enough to negate the presumption of constitutionality. Rather than being required to prove bad intent by a preponderance of the evidence, plaintiffs should be able to trigger some form of
heightened scrutiny by establishing a substantial likelihood of illicit
purpose. The courts might implement this principle by crafting a
burden-shifting framework to address allegations of exclusionary or
anticompetitive intent. The plaintiff would be able to carry her prima
facie case by pointing to a significant danger sign. 2813
The Supreme Court has, however, decided two cases that offered
opportunities for elaborating (or at least inviting) some such burdenshifting stratagem, and on neither occasion did the Court pursue this
284
tack. In the first case, Tashjian, the Court struck down a statute that
disallowed open primaries. Prior to the lawsuit, "the Republican leadership in the state legislature... proposed to amend the statute to allow independents to vote in primaries when permitted by Party
281 Cf Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535
(1993) ("[T]he effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.").
282 Cf Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent,
2006 WIS. L. REV. 843, 888-90 (rec-

ommending heightened means-ends scrutiny of election laws enacted for illegitimate
reasons).
283 For one such proposal, see Christopher S.
Elmendorf, Burdick or Carrington?:
"Fencing Out" and the Voter ID Litigation, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ, Sept. 12, 2006,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/2006/060912.php (proposing a
burden-shifting framework under which a prima facie inference of exclusionary intent
would arise if (1) the voting restriction were enacted substantially along partisan lines;
(2) there were some evidence that the law will disproportionately inconvenience citizens who are statistically more likely to support the opposition party; and (3) the law
were a permanent measure, rather than a time-limited experiment with provisions for
independent evaluation of its impacts on electoral participation by the ostensibly disadvantaged classes). See also Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1135-36 (1989) (showing that the Supreme Court has accommodated plaintiff-friendly, burden-shifting doctrinal frameworks to deal with the problems of illicit motive when fundamental political rights are at stake); cf Crawford v.
Marion County Election Bd., 484 F.3d 436, 437 (7th Cir. 2007) (Wood, J., dissenting
from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) ("[W]hen there is a serious risk that an
election law has been passed with the intent of imposing an additional significant burden on the right to vote of a specific group of voters, the court must apply strict scrutiny.") (emphasis added).
2M 479 U.S. 208
(1986).
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rules."28s5 But "[t]he proposed legislation was defeated, substantially
along party lines, in both houses of the legislature, which at that time
were controlled by the Democratic Party. 286 Although the Court, per
Justice Marshall, applied strict scrutiny, the fact that the open primary
ban was (apparently) being maintained by Democrats in order to keep
the Republican Party from becoming more competitive did not figure,
281
overtly, into the setting of scrutiny levels.
(Then again, a litigant seeking to persuade the courts to adopt an
"indicia of anticompetitive intent" theory might distinguish Tashjian as
a case in which the Court had no need to consider intent, given that
the majority thought strict scrutiny was in order regardless of the
state's purpose. Alternatively, a post-Clingman court might endeavor
to save Tashjian-recall Clingman's criticism of Tashjian's burden analysis2S8-by reinterpreting it as a case in which heightened scrutiny was
impliedly warranted because the open-primary ban was being maintained for partisan reasons.286 )
290
The other puzzling case is Timmons, which sustained Minnesota's ban on fusion candidacies. Fusion bans were enacted throughout the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen291
turies for transparently anticompetitive reasons.
One might think
this history enough to defeat the presumption of permissibility that
would otherwise accompany a cross-endorsement ban. But neither
--• 292
the majority nor the dissent in Timmons put much weight on this.
285Id.at
286Id. at

212.
212-13.

287Rather, Marshall reasoned that "[t] he Party's attempt to broaden the base of
public participation in and support for its activities [was] conduct undeniably central to the
exercise of the right of association." Id. at 214. He further posited that the open-primary
ban affected the Party's "basic function" of selecting candidates. Id. at 216.
288See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (describing Clingman'scriticism
of
Tashjian for failing to address the severity of the burdens imposed).
289 Note in this regard that toward the end of the opinion in Tashjian, the Court
does suggest that when the state seeks to "protect[] the integrity of the Party against
the Party itself[,] ...[then] the views of the State, which to some extent represent the
views of the one political party transiently enjoying majority power.... lose much of
their force." 479 U.S. at 224.
520 U.S. 351 (1997).
29 See generally Peter H. Argersinger, "A Place on the Ballot":
Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws, 85 AM. HIST. REV. 287 (1980) (tracing the history of antifusion legislation
near the turn of the century).
22 As noted above, the majorityjudged the burden "not
severe" because the state
had not interfered with the New Party's organizational arrangements or endorsement
decisions; the dissent took a similarly axiomatic approach, while recognizing a new
category of severe-in-kind burdens. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
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The dissent did touch
on the issue, but its remarks were largely con93
fined to a footnote.
In summary, the doctrinal opening for arguments from legislative
intent in electoral mechanics cases is of an uncertain dimension. The
Supreme Court has variously indicated that state purposes may be
weighed in determining the standard of review, but the Court has done
little to clarify when or why purpose is decisive, let alone to•294explain how
illicit purposes that are not admitted may properly be inferred.
D. What Role Remainsfor EmpiricalBurden Analysis at Step One?
I have argued that the main stem of the Storer-Burdick jurisprudence invites the classification of challenged laws as presumptively
permissible or presumptively impermissible on the basis of relatively
simple, formal inquiries into (1) the type of burden produced, (2)
proxies for impact (qualitative, numerical, and legal landscape cutoffs), and, somewhat more equivocally, (3) legislative purposes. Often, these threshold inquiries seem designed to pick out laws that
threaten aggregate, structural harms to the political process-such as
inadequate openness or loss of accountability-rather than to ensure
that the individual citizen can make the state provide a substantial justification for its laws whenever they operate to exclude her from an
election, or to substantially burden her participation. Laws that the
Court deems presumptively permissible-and this is the default pre295
sumption-receive fairly lax rationality review.
Laws deemed pre-

293 Here

is what the dissent had to say:

[It is [not] irrelevant that when antifusion laws were passed by States all over
the Nation in the latter part of the 1800's, these laws, characterized by the majority as "reforms," were passed by the parties in power in state legislatures...
to squelch the threat posed by the opposition's combined voting force." Although the State is not required now to justify its laws with exclusive reference
to the original purpose behind their passage, this history does provide some
indication of the kind of burden the States themselves believed they were imposing on the smaller parties' effective association.
520 U.S. at 378-79 n.6 (StevensJ., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
294As a general matter, the Court's evidentiary requirements for
showing discriminatory purpose are right-specific. See Ortiz, supra note 283, at 138 (comparing
cases involving economic benefits and fundamental rights).
295It is at least arguable, however, that this species of rationality
review, done
properly, does have some bite vis-A-vis patently arbitrary classifications and standardless
delegations. See supra note 66 (treating Bush v. Gore as a case applying "rational basis
plus" review).
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sumptively impermissible receive strict, though not necessarily fatal,
scrutiny.2""
It is clear that the Supreme Court prefers to address the Burdick
threshold question in formal, nonempirical terms. This is evident
from cases like Munro, Timmons, and Jones, in which social-scientific
and historical evidence figured centrally in the lower courts' burden
analysis but was largely absent from the Supreme Court's determination of scrutiny levels. Even the Justices who sometimes insist that "in
assessing burdens on [the right to vote,] ...we should focus on the
realities of the situation, not on empty formalism," 2 have a tendency
to slip back into formalism. s It does not follow, however, that evidence of the ultimate workings of the challenged law will always be irrelevant in the setting of scrutiny levels.
Inquiries into the actual impact of election laws on voting or political association can occur in several circumstances. First, data may
be used to rebut a structural presumption. Under Storer, a plaintiff
may seek to show that a ballot-access law whose signature threshold is
presumptively permissible (5% or less) nonetheless has the effect of
completely thwarting third-party and independent candidates. Conversely, a state might establish that its presumptively impermissible
signature requirement (10% or more) should receive lax scrutiny because third-party and independent candidates in the state have in fact
qualified for the ballot at roughly the same frequency as in states
whose signature requirements fall below the 5% threshold. 99

26 Following Dunn, strict scrutiny may take the
"best practices" form, which is not
invariably fatal. See supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text.
297Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 610 (2005) (StevensJ.,
dissenting).
298Thus, in Clingman, the dissenters evaded addressing the extent of the burden

by positing (implausibly) that "the impact of the Oklahoma statute on the voters' right
to vote for the candidate of their choosing is not a mere 'burden'; it is a prohibition."
Id. When a political party wants the individuals in question to vote in its primary, the
dissent continued, the state may not "deny them participation... absent a state interest of overriding importance." Id. at 612. Stevens's brisk retreat into formalism perhaps indicates that the dissenting justices were not quite so comfortable assessing "the
realities of the situation" as they had initially purported to be. (Stevens's dissent in
Timmons also has a formalistic cast. See supra notes 100-103.)
Whether the presumptions established by other cutoffs, see supra Parts II.B.2-3,
are similarly subject to rebuttal remains to be determined. In Storer, the Supreme
Court invited attempts at rebuttal by defining both a proxy-based cutoff and an associated "ultimate question forjudgment." See supra Part II.B.1. In the other cutoff cases,
however, the Court did not identify such ultimate questions, leaving considerable uncertainty regarding whether the applicable structural presumption is conclusive (like a
severe-in-kind burden) or rebuttable.
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Data might also be used to fill the gap where scrutiny levels are
not otherwise determined by the in-kind nature of the burden, a
structural presumption, or legislative purposes. Burdick's rhetoric invites this, although the Supreme Court has yet to model it. I expect
the Court to resist such uses of data, however, except in cases where
the social-scientific evidence of a troubling impact is overwhelming
and irrefutable. If the Burdick threshold inquiry is to constrain and
guide judicial intervention into the nuts and bolts of the political
process,30 it will not do to have lower courts finding "severe" burdens
here and there on the basis of "data" that amount to little more than
hunch and anecdote.0 1

300
301

See supra Part 1.
A skeptic or cynic might argue that the Supreme Court itself has twice inter-

vened in the Burdick era on the basis of hunch and anecdote, without recourse to inkind burden characterizations, structural-presumption cutoffs, or legislative intent. In
Part III.A of Norman v. Reed, the Court axed a provision of Illinois's ballot-access law
that barred "candidates running in one political subdivision from.., using the name
of a political party established only in another." 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992). The Court
dealt with this summarily, stating that the provision "would obviously foreclose the development of any political party lacking the resources to run a statewide campaign."
Id. (emphasis added). Apparently this allegedly self-evident truth was enough to dispatch the presumption of permissibility, as the Court struck down the prohibition after
concluding that more narrowly drawn alternatives appeared feasible (e.g., requiring
the candidate to get the party's permission before using the party label). Id.
In the second case, Buckley v. American ConstitutionalLaw Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S.
182 (1999), the Court's burden analysis was a little more involved. Buckley addressed
Colorado's regulation of the process by which ballot-initiative sponsors gather the requisite number of signatures to put their proposals on the ballot. The Court struck
down the state's requirement that petition circulators be registered Colorado voters,
and that they wear a badge displaying their name, their status as paid or volunteer, and
the name and telephone number of their employer. Id. at 200.
The registered-voter requirement was deemed severely burdensome because it
"drastically reduce[d]" the pool of potential circulators, given that 400,000 voting-age
Coloradans were not registered to vote. Id. at 193. The Court also relied on testimony
from two local activists, who averred that some people who were sympathetic to particular ballot initiatives declined to register as a form of protest. Id. at 194. However,
as Justice O'Connor emphasized in her dissent, there was no evidence in the record
that initiative proponents were materially hindered in their recruitment of circulators
by the registered-voter requirement. See id. at 218 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). (For a reduction in the pool to have a material impact, it must
be the case that the size of the pool is a limiting factor, and that unregistered would-be
circulators are unwilling to register in order to qualify to circulate.) In short, although
the majority's finding of a severe burden was nominally predicated on the challenged
requirement's anticipated impact on the amount of petition-circulation speech, that
impact, if any, was wholly a matter ofjudicial surmise. (Justice Thomas, concurring,
ventured that strict scrutiny was in order because the circulation of initiative petitions
involves "core political speech." Id. at 210. This in-kind approach to the characterization of burdens is entirely consistent with the main stem of Storer-Burdick)
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And there is every reason to think that the Justices of the Supreme
Court will want to keep lower courts from intervening in political
process cases on the basis of hunch and anecdote. 302 If district judges
are encouraged to rework election laws in accordance with their own
sense of what is fair and right, it seems inevitable that the judges' own
partisan sympathies will shine through. 30 3 This would not be healthy
for the reputation of the judiciary as a whole. Nor would it ensure
that lawmakers have the space they need to test out new ways of organizing and administering elections. Nor would it build public confidence in the integrity of elections. Perhaps sensing these perils, a few
lower court judges have themselves abjured reliance on intuition and
anecdote at Burdick step one; they have taken the position that rational basis is the governing standard of review in electoral mechanics
cases unless and until plaintiffs introduce hard evidence of a substantial exclusionary effect. 0 4

Consider also how the Justices dealt with the badge requirement. The majority,
like the court below, found the burden severe because the requirement "forces circulators to reveal their identities at the same time they deliver their political message," exposing them to "heat of the moment" harassment. Id. at 198-99 (quoting Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1102 (10th Cir. 1997)). First-person
anecdotes from a handful of political organizers provided the evidentiary basis for this
conclusion. Justice O'Connor, who concurred on the badge issue, was on somewhat
firmer footing. She stressed the manner in which the badge requirement affected
speech, calling it a "direct" burden on "the one-on-one, communicative aspect of petition circulation." Id. at 215. This is a textbook illustration of in-kind burden analysis.
In the final analysis, Buckley is probably best seen as an instance of in-kind burden
characterization (a reading adopted, albeit without my terminology, in Caruso v. Yamhill County, 422 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2005)), and Part II.A of Norman as perhaps an application of "rational basis plus" review. Alternatively, they might be seen as uncertain
initial forays, addressing unfamiliar types of laws, merely preludes to the eventual
promulgation of a more structured framework for reviewing such kinds of laws. Cf
supra note 120 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme Court's pattern of first
treating a subject with vague standards, and later following up with a more structured
framework after lower courts have had some time to explore the issue).
302 Particularly insofar as the justices of the Supreme
Court and the judges of the
lower federal courts are ideologically out of sync.
303 Rick Hasen, among others, has suggested that
this is one of the lessons, to date,
of the voter ID litigation. See Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60
STAN. L. REv. 101, 139-40 (2007).
304 See, e.g., Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita,
458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 822 (S.D. Ind.
2006); Gonzalez v. Arizona, No. 06-1268, slip op. at *7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2006); cf.
Overton, supra note 29, at 665-66 (calling on judges to ground interventions in voter
ID cases on empirical evidence, lest "personal political ideology" end up driving the
analysis).
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Empirical data may also play an important subdoctrinal role in
electoral mechanics cases. °5 Judges must be convinced that a serious
problem exists before they will develop the law so as to remedy it.
Empirical data may well motivate doctrinal development, even if the
development itself takes the form of a new or refined structural presumption.
III. MAKING THE MOST OF FORMALISM: OPPORTUNITIES
FOR DOCTRINAL ELABORATION

Assume I am right that the Supreme Court's electoral mechanics
jurisprudence manifests a strong methodological preference for formalism at the threshold, scrutiny-level-determining stage of the judicial inquiry, and that the Court's threshold tests are often concerned
with structural or aggregate properties of the political process (such as
electoral accountability or adequate openness). How should this affect the thinking of district courts? What, if anything, should the Supreme Court do to acknowledge it? This Part offers some tentative
suggestions. For concreteness, I shall use the recent litigation over
Georgia's new photo ID requirement for voting as a starting point.
Let me emphasize that my goal in this Part is mainly to illustrate
and concretize doctrinal possibilities, not to prescribe any particular
approach. In subsequent work, I shall offer a more elaborate exposition and normative defense of some of the ideas sketched in bare outline below.
A. Suggestionsfor Lower Courts
In 2005, the Republican-controlled Georgia state legislature enacted House Bill 244 (H.B. 244), 306, which required all in-person voters
to show official, current photo ID issued by the State of Georgia or the
federal government.3°7 The legislature also raised the fee for state-

305 Thanks to Floyd Feeney for suggesting this
point.
306 The

bill, H.B. 244, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005), amended several sec-

tions of the Georgia Code, including GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (2006).
307For a succinct history of Georgia's photo ID requirement for voting,
see Common Cause/Georgiav. Billups (Common Cause/Ga. 11), 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1297-1300
(N.D. Ga. 2006).
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issued ID cards,308 and authorized any voter who wished to do so to
vote absentee, without showing ID. 3
Voters could obtain qualifying ID by appearing in person at any
Department of Driver Services (DDS) customer service center, furnishing documentation, and paying a twenty dollar fee.3") First-time
applicants were required to prove their identity with an original, stateissued birth certificate (or a certified copy), certificate of birth registration, certified naturalization records, INS immigration card, or
valid passport. 311 To assist financially strapped voters, H.B. 244 waived
the photo ID fee for any Georgia citizen "who swears under oath that
he or she is indigent and cannot pay the fee. .
sires an identification card in order to vote. . .

that he or she deand that he or she

. ,
,

does not have any other [acceptable] form of identification."3 2 To
moderate the burden on citizens unaware of the ID requirement, H.B.
244 permitted voters who showed up at the polls without qualifying ID
only count
to cast provisional ballots-but the provisional ballot would
13
if the voter furnished photo ID within forty-eight hours.
The plaintiffs in Common Cause/GeorgiaIattacked this law as a poll
314
tax and as an undue burden on the right to vote . 4 As evidence of the
burden, they submitted affidavits from thirty-five registered voters,
many of whom were poor, disabled, elderly, or African-American, who
attested to their lack of qualifying ID and the difficulties they would
face in trying to obtain one (including cost, inconvenience, and lack
of supporting documentation).3 1 5 The plaintiffs introduced no record

308 Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Common Cause/Ga. I), 406 F. Supp. 2d
1326,

1339 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
3_ Id. at 1332-33,
1337-38.
310
31

Id. at 1338-39.
Id. at 1340.

312 Id. at 1337. In addition, to assist voters who would have difficulty getting to one

of the then-existing fifty-eight DDS service centers statewide (none were located within
the city limits of Atlanta), H.B. 244 provided for "a mobile issuance bus known as the
Georgia Licensing on Wheels ('GLOW') Bus." Id. at 1338. The bus made scheduled
stops around the state; also, "any group" could sponsor an appearance of the bus in
their community "by making arrangements with the DDS." Id. However, GLOW was
incapable of issuing ID to the wheelchair-bound and others who could not ascend the
bus steps. Id. at 1338-39.
313

Id. at 1354.

314

Id.

315

More specifically, the affiants variously attested to some or all of the following:

*that they lacked an acceptable form of ID because (other than for voting) "they
have no need" for it;
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evidence, however, regarding the number of registered voters who
lacked qualifying ID. Georgia had only recently begun collecting Social Security numbers from persons issued driver's licenses or nondriver photo ID cards, so it was not feasible to use state databases to
determine the number of registered voters who lacked even these
forms of ID. 16
Federal district judge Harold L. Murphy granted the plaintiffs'
317
motion for a preliminary injunction, applying strict scrutiny.
The
court gave two independent bases for its level-of-scrutiny determination. It held, first, that the state's failure to provide free ID cards to
318
anyone who lacked other qualifying ID was tantamount to a poll tax.
Second, relying on the plaintiffs' affiants, the court ruled that the ID
requirement would represent a substantial burden for "many" lowincome, disabled, elderly, and African-American voters.3 9 Even apart
from the poll tax characterization, the burden was severe enough to
warrant exacting scrutiny under Burdick.32°

*that they were "not indigent," but did "not have $20 to spend for a Photo ID
card that they [did] not need except for purposes of voting";
*that they were African-American, elderly, or had "disabilities that [made] it difficult for them to travel to a DDS service center, to walk for long distances, or
to stand in line";
*that they would "have to rely on family members or friends for transportation,
or [could not] obtain transportation to a DDS service center," or "would have
difficulty taking off from work to go to a DDS service center";
*that they "had problems obtaining necessary information, such as birth certificates," either because they would have difficulty getting to the health department and paying the $10 fee, or because "their legal names did not match the
names they used for voter purposes or the names on their birth certificates,"
or because the bureaucrats in their state of birth "could not find" their birth
certificates;
*that they had had to travel as many as twenty miles to a DDS service center and
wait in line for as long as two or three hours to renew or obtain a driver's license or photo ID.
Id. at 134042.
316Id. at 1340. Note that these figures, if available, would represent
an upper
bound on the number of voters who lacked qualifying ID (because some voters without
qualifying state ID may have qualifying ID issued by the federal government).
317 Id. at 1362, 1366, 1376.
318 Id. at 1366-69. While voters without ID could vote absentee under H.B. 244,
the district judge held, id. at 1367, that complying with the absentee voting procedures
constituted a "material requirement" within the meaning of Harman v. Forssenius, 380
U.S. 528, 540-42 (1965), which held that no state could save a poll tax by providing
nonpaying voters with an alternative voting procedure, if that procedure amounted to
a material requirement.
319 See Common Cause/Ga. 1, 406
F. Supp. 2d at 1362-66.
320Id. at 1366.
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Judge Murphy's conclusion about the magnitude of the burden
on vulnerable voters manifestly depended on hunch and anecdote.
The personal experiences of a few dozen voters hand-picked by the
plaintiffs' attorneys seem, at best, a doubtful basis on which to generalize about the effects of the ID requirement on low-income, disabled,
elderly, and minority communities at large. Such generalizations will
seem plausible only to the judge whose "common sense" they reinforce." 1 Judge Murphy's hunch-based decision making was even more
apparent in his response to the defendants' argument that because
Georgia had authorized universal absentee voting and excused absentee voters from the ID requirement, the burden of the ID requirement was necessarily minimal. Thejudge replied:
Absent more information indicating that the State made an effort to inform Georgia voters concerning the new, relaxed absentee voting procedures, many Georgia voters simply may be unaware that the rules have
changed....
The absentee voting process also requires that voters plan sufficiently
enough ahead to request an absentee ballot, to have the ballot delivered
from the registrar's office via the United States Postal Service, to complete the ballot successfully, and to mail the absentee ballot to the registrar's office sufficiently early to allow the United States Postal Service to
deliver the absentee ballot to the registrar by 7:00 p.m. on election day.
The majority of voters-particularly those voters who lack Photo IDwould322not plan sufficiently enough ahead to vote via absentee ballot successfully.

The plaintiffs, however, had not produced evidence that ID-less
voters were unaware of the absentee-voting alternative. Nor had the
plaintiffs shown that absentee voters had or would have problems getting their ballots submitted on time. Judge Murphy seems to have
gone on nothing more than surmise.
After Judge Murphy enjoined enforcement of H.B. 244, the Georgia legislature returned to the drawing board. The new ID bill, Senate
Bill 84 (S.B. 84) , retained its predecessor's requirement of current
photo ID to vote at the polls (but not absentee), while purporting to
ease the acquisition of qualified ID. Most notably, S.B. 84 provided
for a new "Georgia voter identification card," which each county
Cf Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 808 (S.D. Ind. 2006)
(arguing that a court should not "assume disparate impact based on what 'common
sense' tells us to be true").
32 Common Cause/Ga. 1, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1364-65 (emphasis
added).
323 S.B. 84, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga.
2006).
321
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board of registrars was to issue, free of charge, to any resident who
furnished identity documents and who averred that he lacked other
qualifying photo ID.5 24 No longer required to present a birth certificate or other costly documentation, applicants for the voter ID card
were allowed to establish their identity with many types of supporting
documentation-even as little as a completed voter registration form
325
or voting precinct card.
The plaintiffs in Common Cause/GeorgiaIIdeveloped a much richer
evidentiary record than they had in the litigation the previous year.
They submitted several estimates indicating that hundreds of thousands of voting-age Georgians lacked driver's licenses, with the elderly
and African Americans disproportionately represented.326 A study of
recent elections showed that voters without DDS-issued IDs were more
likely to have participated in the Democratic than in the Republican
primary. 327 To demonstrate the supposed inadequacy of the absenteevoting alternative, the plaintiffs procured a declaration from a literacy
expert, who ventured that "less than forty percent of adults in Georgia
are capable of reading and comprehending the absentee ballot application.",328 Finally, the plaintiffs introduced evidence regarding the
State Election Board's recently initiated campaign to educate voters
about the ID requirement.3

29

At the time of the plaintiffs' motion for

a preliminary injunction, a few weeks before the July 18, 2006, primary, the Board had just begun to air a series of public service announcements. The plaintiffs established that the stations on which
the ads were running had a listenership of only 900,000 adults (not all
Common Cause/Ga. II, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1305 (N.D. Ga.
2006).
See id. at 1306-08. Technically, applicants were required to produce
(1) an
"identity document," either photographic or, if not photographic, one with the applicant's "full legal name and date of birth"; (2) "[d]ocumentation showing the person's
date of birth"; (3) evidence of registration to vote in the state of Georgia; and (4)
"[d]ocumentation showing the person's name and address of principal residence." Id.
at 1308. It was not disputed, however, that these requirements could all be fulfilled
with a completed voter registration application or precinct card. Id. at 1329.
326 See id. at 1306.
327 In subsequent litigation, this study was ultimately
deemed inadmissible, in part
due to concerns about the underlying data and in part due to the judge's belief that it
was not relevant. See Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Common Cause/Ga. I1), 504 F.
Supp. 2d 1333, 1370-71 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (granting defendants' motion to exclude reports and testimony of plaintiffs' experts).
328 Common Cause/Ga. II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1316. This expert's testimony
was later
ruled inadmissible, after the court determined that being able to read the absentee
ballot application was not necessary to vote absentee. See Common Cause/Ga. Il1, 504 F.
Supp. 2d at 1379.
329Common Cause/Ga.II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1312, 1313-14, 1317, 1329.
324
325
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and that the ads were broadcast at odd hours of
the night and early morning. 3 '
As he had the previous year, Judge Murphy entered a preliminary
injunction against the ID requirement, after concluding that the burden was severe enough to warrant strict scrutiny.3 2 He repeated his
finding from Common Cause/GeorgiaI that "many voters"--especially
African Americans, the elderly or disabled, and the poor330

have no transportation to a voter registrar's office or DDS service center,
have impairments that preclude them from waiting in often-lengthy lines
to obtain Voter ID cards or Photo ID cards, or cannot travel to a registrar's office or a DDS service center during those locations' usual hours
of operation because the voters do not have transportation available.333
However, Judge Murphy rejected the plaintiffs' poll-tax argument, 334 and he allowed that S.B. 84 might pass muster "if the State
undertakes sufficient steps to inform voters of the ... Act's requirements before future elections. 3 5 It was the state's responsibility to
give notice of the new ID requirement, in advance of the elections, in
a manner "reasonably calculated to reach the voters who are most
likely to lack a Photo ID. 3 36
A year later, following a bench trial, Judge Murphy lifted his injunction.337 He held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the
new ID requirement would represent an "appreciable" hardship for
any voter. 338 The burden was not appreciable because, in the months
since Judge Murphy's last order, the state had made "exceptional" efforts to contact voters and inform them of the new requirements, and
because once informed, voters should not have had difficulty either
obtaining a qualifying ID or arranging to vote absentee.3 3 9 The plaintiffs therefore lacked standing. 34° Reaching the merits in the alternative, Judge Murphy stated that the same lack of proven, "appreciable"
Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1341.
332 1d. at
1358.
333 Id. at
1345.
334 Id. at
1355.
335 Id. at
1351.
336 Id. at
1346.
337Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Common Cause/Ga. 111),
504 F. Supp. 2d 1333,
1382-83 (N.D. Ga.2007).
338 Id. at 1380 (quoting Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita,
458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 82223 (S.D. Ind. 2006)).
339 Id. at 1377-80.
340 Id. at 1371-74.
3,30

331
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burdens meant that the standard of review was rational basis rather
342
341
At that point, the game was over.
than strict scrutiny.
Viewed as a whole, Judge Murphy's several opinions seem to rest
on the following ideas about how the Burdick burden inquiry is properly applied in voter participation cases. For openers, not all statecreated impediments to the exercise of the franchise are constitutionally cognizable. Only burdens that a reasonable citizen would have
some difficulty surmounting-would find "appreciable"-merit the
courts' attention. (Reasonable citizens are not always aware of the latest legal developments, however, so if the state wants to add new voting requirements-even modest ones-it should make a reasonable,
good-faith effort to give advance notice to the affected voters.) In addition, an appreciable burden on any one citizen is generally not
enough to trigger strict scrutiny. Rather, "burden severity," for scrutiny level purposes, depends on the number and demographic distribution of citizens who face appreciable burdens. If these citizens are
concentrated within politically identifiable groups, especially disadvantaged groups, the burden is more likely to warrant classification as
severe.
In light of the Supreme Court's electoral mechanics jurisprudence, what can we say about Judge Murphy's reasoning? Both his
cavalier attitude toward seemingly minor barriers to voting and his
concern about the incidence of material burdens have counterparts in
We certainly cannot say that his rulthe Supreme Court's decisions.
ings lacked plausible foundations in precedent.
Yet, with the possible exception of the poll tax analysis in Common
Cause/GeorgiaI, Judge Murphy's reasoning should give us pause. Here

The judge did pause to distinguish his earlier rulings, stating that they reflected
the "more relaxed evidentiary standards" appropriate to a preliminary injunction hearing. Id. at 1379.
342Id. at 1380.
33 For a recent example of the former (a cavalier attitude
toward putatively minor
barriers to the exercise of the franchise), see Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 592-93
(2005) (dismissing the notion that a requirement that voters enroll in a party before
voting in its primary could warrant strict scrutiny). Attention to the likely incidence of
burdens-even seemingly minor burdens-is displayed in the cases concerning the
imposition of economic conditions on political participation. See supra Part ILA; see
also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983) ("[I]t is especially difficult for
the state to justify a restriction that limits political participation by an identifiable political group whose members share a particular viewpoint, associational preference, or
economic status.").
3
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we have a district judge appointed by a Democratic president ruling
on the constitutionality of an electoral reform, bitterly opposed by
Democrats, that was a top priority for the Republican-controlled legislature of the State of Georgia. Under the governing precedents, the
district court had to make a threshold inquiry to determine whether
the photo ID requirement should receive the ordinary electoral mechanics presumption of permissibility. The judge-a Democratcarried out that inquiry in a manner that was utterly dependent on
the judge's personal sense of what is fair and reasonable. Judge Murphy's preliminary injunctions turned on sheer guesswork about the
likely impact of the ID requirement. Later, ruling on the merits,
Judge Murphy purported to hold the plaintiffs to a more demanding
evidentiary standard, but the substance of his inquiry was no less dependent on his moral and policy intuitions. His burden determination boiled down to two open-ended judgment calls: whether the
state had done enough to inform voters of the new requirements, and
whether the protocol for obtaining voter ID was sufficiently lenient as
to fall below the threshold of appreciability. These judgments were
unanchored by anything approaching a clear-cut structural presumption.
As it happened, Judge Murphy did not toe the Democratic Party
line in applying the "appreciable burden" standard. An observer who
worries about the fact or appearance of judicial partisanship in election law cases may take some comfort in this. It is nonetheless disappointing-and, equally, a sign of the confusion created by Burdick's
statement of doctrine-that Judge Murphy wholly failed to consider
the opportunities for setting scrutiny levels in a more regularized and
less intensely subjective manner.
Judge Murphy did have other options, which he might have pursued had he understood how the Supreme Court uses the Burdick
threshold test as an occasion for formal, presumption-guided inquiries
into whether the constitutional costs (in terms of open, accountable
democratic government) of the challenged requirements are likely to
substantially outweigh their benefits. s44
For example, Judge Murphy might have held in Common
Cause/GeorgiaI that heightened scrutiny was in order because of H.B.

344 In the following discussion, I shall assume
that it is legitimate for lower courts
to model their application of the Burdick threshold test on the Supreme Court's practice, even if that practice diverges from the approach suggested by a face-value reading
of the test.
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At the time,
244's incongruity with the larger legal landscape. "3
Georgia was alone in requiring a current, government-issued photo ID
for in-person voting. 34 No other state required it; no other state had
ever required it. This type of argument from the legal landscape is a
among states,347
bit different from Randall's relative-level 1,comparison
348
• •
but that does not
and Norman's emphasis on state-local disparities,
warrant rejecting it if the judge otherwise considers it a sound basis
for negating the presumption of permissibility. 349 Lower courts per35
346

See supra notes 306-313 and accompanying text (discussing H.B. 244).
For a discussion of state-by-state and historical variation in ID requirements for

voting, see Overton, supranote 29, at 63844.
37 See supra Part Il.B.3.a. Of course, Randall had not been decided when Judge
Murphy issued his opinion in Common Cause/GeorgiaI.
3 See supra Part II.B.3.b.
349 Though rare, there are a handful of voter participation cases in
which lower
courts have characterized burdens on the basis of innovative arguments from the legal
landscape. See Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1352-54 (4th Cir. 1993) (striking
down a voter registration law requiring registrants to submit their Social Security number without protecting the number from subsequent disclosure, and relying upon various federal statutes' protection of the privacy interest in Social Security numbers to
establish that the Virginia law at issue was "severely" burdensome by virtue of its failure
to include analogous protections); Project Vote v. Blackwell, 455 F. Supp. 2d 694, 703
(N.D. Ohio 2006) (relying, in part, on the defendants' inability "to point to any other
state that has enacted anything remotely similar" in characterizing the burden as severe); Bay County Democratic Party v. Land, 347 F. Supp. 2d 404, 434-35 (E.D. Mich.
2004) (sustaining under Burdick various state requirements for the casting and tallying
of provisional ballots, after observing that the state requirements were patterned on
federal requirements whose constitutionality the plaintiffs did not contest); Colo. Common Cause v. Davidson, No. 04-7709, 2004 WL 2360485, at *12-13 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Oct.
18, 2004) (sustaining state-law voter ID requirements, under Burdick, on the theory
that they were only "marginally more intrusive than the already existing federal identification requirement under [the Help America Vote Act], which, significantly, Plaintiffs do not challenge").
Legal landscape arguments have also played a role in the litigation over New
York's ballot-access laws for presidential primaries. In Rockefeller v. Powers, 917 F. Supp.
155, 160-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), affid, 78 F.3d 44, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1996), the district court
and the Second Circuit made much of the fact that New York authorized political parties to choose between two ballot-access regimes. One regime, adopted by the Republican Party, was much more restrictive than the other, which had been adopted by the
Democratic Party. In these opinions, it appears that the intrastate disparity in ballotaccess regimes matters largely at the justification stage of the analysis, and does not, as
such, warrant heightened scrutiny. However, the Second Circuit subsequently revisited
the Rockefeller litigation, and in doing so treated the intra-state disparity as a reason for
heightened scrutiny. See Prestia v. O'Connor, 178 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1999) (describing the intrastate disparity in Rockefeller as a "special circumstance" that, in conjunction
with other such circumstances, warranted strict scrutiny).
For an illuminating overview of the presidential primary ballot-access litigation in
New York, see Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The ConstitutionalConstraintson
PrimryBallot Access Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181, 2199-2206 (2001).
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form a valuable service when they experiment at the doctrinal margins, generating new possibilities, broadly consistent with the Supreme
Court's methodological preferences, that the Court can learn from
and possibly adopt.
Judge Murphy might also have developed an argument based on
legislative intent or purpose. One option would have been to engage
in an Arlington Heights-like inquiry into the totality of the circumstances 5°-including the substance of the law, the manner in which it
was enacted, and any other potentially relevant background factsand on this basis decide whether the law's proponents intended to reduce the number of votes cast by certain citizens "because of the way
they may vote. "3' That inquiry, while doctrinally available, is perhaps
too incendiary and subjective for the courts safely to employ in reguIt is one thing for a Democratic judge to
lating voting procedures.
rule that a Republican legislature excessively encumbered the right to
vote, or that the state should have given better notice of new voting
requirements. It is quite another for the judge to proclaim that the
law's proponents acted for wholly illegitimate reasons when the evidence that they did so consists of little more than partisanship-inenactment combined with the judge's belief that the law is substantively unreasonable.
But arguments from intent or purpose need not be deployed in
quite so perilous a way. Bearing in mind the "danger signs" meta-

See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 26668 (1977) (noting that the determination of "whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and
direct evidence of intent as may be available," including "[t]he impact of the official
action"; "[t]he historical background of the decision ....particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes"; procedurally or substantively aberrational decision making; and "legislative or administrative history").
351 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965); cf Levy v. Scranton,
780 F. Supp.
897, 901-02 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (using Arlington Heights to implement Carrington in the
context of a state law affecting the voting rights of students).
352 Since Carringtonwas decided in 1965, there have been only a handful ofjudicial
decisions striking down election laws on the ground that they were intended to "fence
out" a politically identifiable segment of the electorate. See Equal. Found. of Greater
Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 417, 433-34 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (declaring invalid a city charter amendment that purportedly fenced out homosexuals
from the political process), rev'd, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997); Sloane v. Smith, 351 F.
Supp. 1299 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (declaring invalid a county law restricting ballot access of
university students); Castro v. California, 466 P.2d 244, 256 (Cal. 1970) (finding no
compelling state interest to justify an English literacy requirement to vote); Keane v.
Mihaly, 90 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (discussing the danger that a one-year
residency requirement for voting would fence out a sector of the population).
350
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phor, Judge Murphy might have negated the presumption of permissibility on the theory that certain indicators ("as objective as we can
make them") of exclusionary intent were present. 53 The court would
not have had to say that the law actually was enacted for illegitimate
reasons, only that a reasonable person might worry that it was (by dint
of said indicators). This determination would be enough to trigger
meaningful judicial assessment of the law's substance-without an ultimate pronouncement on the reason for the law's enactment.
In Common Cause/GeorgiaII, the danger signs included (1) the fact
that the law was enacted substantially along partisan lines; (2) the fact
that the law was a replacement for voting requirements previously
struck down as unconstitutional, and was pushed through by the same
coalition of lawmakers who had supported the unconstitutional
predecessor; (3) the fact that the law did nothing to target absentee
voting fraud, the one form of voting fraud whose existence was well
documented; and, arguably, (4) some suggestive though hardly conclusive evidence of a disparate impact on voters who tend to support
Democrats.
A district judge in Murphy's position might also have begun to
sketch out, in dicta, a set of "safety signs" (the reverse of danger
signs), both to assist the Georgia legislature when it next takes up the
issue of ID requirements for voting, and to circumscribe the federal
courts' involvement in heated partisan disputes over the ground rules
of electoral competition. For example, the court might have hinted
that voting requirements deemed suspect because of partisanship-inenactment plus some evidence of exclusionary effects would nonetheless retain the normal presumption of permissibility if put in place on
an experimental basis. Judicial implementation of this idea would require establishing structural presumptions about sunset provisions
(e.g., for how many elections may a law designated experimental remain in force?), and might also necessitate substantive judicial review
of the reasonableness of provisions for monitoring and evaluation.
Doctrinally, a defense of the experiment-as-safety-sign approach would
require some pretty imaginative judicial reasoning, but a colorable argument might be crafted.355
See supra Part II.C.3.
See Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Common Cause/Ga. II), 439 F. Supp. 2d
1294, 1298, 1304-05, 1311-13 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
355 In at least one context-the determination of what qualifies
as "congruent and
proportional" remedial legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendmentthe Supreme Court already treats sunset provisions as a relevant factor in assessing the
353

354
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There are other safety-sign possibilities. On the right facts, a court
might give a free pass to an otherwise suspect voting procedure because it was vetted and approved by a substantially nonpartisan or bipartisan institution, such as an electoral commission or "citizens' assembly." 356 My point here is not to say that any particular safety-signs
strategy is desirable, only that some such approach would be congruent with the Supreme Court's use of threshold inquiries in electoral
mechanics cases.
My broader point is this: when faced with unfamiliar cases about
the voting process, the lower courts should look to the Supreme
Court's practice as well as its rhetoric. They would do well to appreciate the "danger signs" logic and structural ambitions of much of the
Storer-Burdick jurisprudence. Over time, the lower courts stand to
make much more lasting and significant contributions to the constitutional law of democracy if they can articulate and apply severe-in-kind,
structural-presumption, and intent-based approaches to the Burdick
threshold question, particularly if they keep the threshold inquiry
simple and amenable to even-handed application by judges with varying ideological predilections.
B. Suggestionsfor the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court need not announce any radical about-face in
order to encourage lower-court experimentation with the techniques
constitutionality of challenged laws. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533
(1997); Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: ProtectingFundamental Values
with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1721-26
(2001) (discussing "constitutional sunset rules"). Substantive judicial review of monitoring and evaluation provisions might be defended as part and parcel of a more general turn toward experimentalism in equal protection jurisprudence. See generally
Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 261 (2004); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, DestabilizationRights:
How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004). The approach suggested here might also be joined to one of the foundational ideas of the Storer-Burdick
jurisprudence: that in adjudicating ight-to-vote claims, courts should exercise care
not to "tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably
and efficiently." See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992)); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,
126 S. Ct. 2594, 2607-08 (2006) (recognizing that under the Constitution, "the legislative branch plays the ptimary role in congressional redistricting" and other issues related to the "Times, Places and Manner" of holding congressional elections).
.56 See Elmendorf, supra note 60, at 435-36; cf. Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for
the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 709-10
(2006) (advancing a related idea to guide implementation of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act).
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for choosing scrutiny levels I have discussed. A few small steps would
suffice. First, the Court should expressly incorporate the "danger
signs" metaphor into the electoral mechanics jurisprudence-not as a
replacement for Burdick's language of burdens, but as a supplement.
This should help lower courts see that the Burdick threshold inquiry
need not entail ascertaining the actual impact of challenged laws on
voting and political association. Second, the Court should acknowledge that the threshold inquiry is about more than keeping the federal courts from tying "the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently., 357 It is also about
managing the risk that the federal courts will end up assuming "political, not legal responsibility for a process that often produces ill will
and distrust., 358 (Risk management, not risk minimization: the day of
Justice Frankfurter's minimization strategy-an expansive political
question doctrine-has long since passed. 359) Once judges see the
threshold test in this way, it becomes easier to appreciate the reasons
for formalism, and also the importance of holding back except in
cases where "clues, as objective as we can make them,"
suggest that the
36 0
payoff from judicial intervention is potentially great.
Third, the Court should clarify that "burden severity," or, equivalently, the presence of danger signs, should be reviewed de novo on
appeal. Doing so would signal that the threshold inquiry is about
more than measuring the impact of the challenged law. De novo review would also give the circuit courts more control over district
courts' level-of-scrutiny determinations, which is welcome if for no
other reason than that the courts of appeal sit in panels, and decisions
jointly made by three judges are less likely to be idiosyncratic than the
decisions of single judges acting alone. Given the potential political
ramifications of judicial interventions in electoral mechanics cases,
this constraint on district court discretion is probably advisable.
One might also think that the Supreme Court should offer lower
courts more direction about substantive norms to advance in developing and elaborating the threshold tests. It is a favorite sport of law
professors to bash the Supreme Court for not having enough theory
about what it is doing-and there is more to this than sport. Lower
357

Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.

358 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (quoting Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541

U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (KennedyJ., concurring)).
359 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
360 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (quoting Vieth,
541 U.S. at 344
(SouterJ., dissenting)).
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courts cannot be expected to design or evaluate methods of sorting
electoral mechanics into presumptively permissible and presumptively
impermissible categories without an underlying theory of what the
Constitution should be read to achieve.36' I accept this much, yet I
doubt that a narrowly directive theory would be appropriate. The
constitutional goods that the courts should (plausibly) seek to protect
in the domain of election law are irreducibly plural.362 Over the years,
the Court has variously suggested that the right to vote serves to protect, among other things, the dignitary interests of citizens as individuals, the responsiveness of government to the citizenry as a whole
(not just to privileged groups within the citizenry), and public confidence in and acceptance of the electoral process ("legitimacy") .363 All
of these are important values, and in the absence of clear textual
guidance it is doubtful that there is a defensible basis for categorically
prioritizing one of them. It may be enough for the Supreme Court to
indicate that precisely because the Constitution does not express a
clear design for the constitutional law of democracy, the courts should
intervene mainly in situations where a broad consensus of informed
opinion would support the intervention, or where the intervention
seems necessary to maintain a political order that most citizens can
accept as tolerably legitimate.

361

Cf Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker

v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
failure to settle on a clear normative foundation for its malapportionment jurisprudence led to arbitrary decisions).
362 Cf Richard H. Pildes, What Kind of Right Is "The
Right To Vote"?, 93 VA. L. REV.
IN BRIEF 43, 43 (2007) ("Not only does the right to vote protect several different core
interests, but these interests are also qualitatively distinct. Put in other terms, there is
not one right to vote. There are several.").
363See Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political
Rights,
50 STAN. L. REV. 915 (1998) (addressing the dignitary, legitimizing, and goodgovernment functions of the right to vote in Supreme Court doctrine as well as in public debates concerning the enactment of the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments);
Gerken, supra note 361, at 1419-27 (identifying four germinal purposes in the Court's
early malapportionment decisions: preventing "lock-up" of the political process by a
numerical minority, guarding against group-based animus, ensuring that each voter
effectively exercises her "fair share" of political power, and protecting citizens' dignitary interests against "expressive harms"); Karlan, supra note 6, at 709-19 (distinguishing among participation, aggregation, and governance values, each of which the right
to vote might be thought to protect).
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CONCLUSION

It is by now well understood that burdens on the right to vote and
the affiliated right to associate for political change need not trigger
strict scrutiny. Rather, constitutional challenges to electoral mechanics are resolved using a nominal balancing test, under which the level
of scrutiny purportedly varies with the "character and magnitude" of
the associated burden. Although the Supreme Court has long said
that "no litmus-paper test" separates valid from invalid electoral mechanics, and although the Court's rhetoric seems to command empirical inquiry into the "magnitude" of electoral mechanics burdens,
this is misleading. The Court has, in fact, created or invited the creation of a number of "litmus-paper tests" for setting scrutiny levels in
electoral mechanics cases-tests that involve assessing the type of burden created, simple proxies for impact (and associated numerical,
qualitative, and legal-landscape cutoffs), and legislative purpose. Often, these tests manifest a concern for aggregate or structural properties of the electoral system, not just the defensibility of individuated
burdens. In the hopes of facilitating the work of courts and litigants,
particularly those faced with the new generation of voter participation
claims, this Article has mapped and explained the legal terrain. I
leave to future work the task of exploring what sort of threshold inquiry in electoral mechanics cases would be most appropriate.

